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Reasoning about assertions, obligations and causality: 
on a categorical semantics for a logic for pragmatics 
Kurt Ranalter 
Abstract 
The aim of the logic for pragmatics considered in this work is to provide a logical framework 
that formalises reasoning about the pragmatic forces with which a sentence may be uttered. The 
concept of pragmatic or illocutionary force comes from speech act theory and plays a crucial role 
also in certain branches of artificial intelligence, in particular in the development of communica-
tion protocols for software agents. Instead of considering the full-blown theory of speech acts, 
we focus on speech acts that either have the pragmatic force of an assertion or the pragmatic 
force of an obligation, and on how these speech acts may be related to each other. In particular, 
we are interested in a principle proposed by Bellin and Dalla Pozza that allows one to promote 
acts of obligations through causal chains of acts of assertions. The main achievement of this 
thesis is a sound and complete categorical semantics for a logic for pragmatics incorporating the 
aforementioned principle. One of the benefits of the proposed semantics is that it allows one to 
deal with conditional obligations as well, thus extending the framework in a very interesting way. 
Although the logical framework considered in this work incorporates only two types of speech 
acts, we hope to be able to show that we have a well-behaved core fragment that can serve as a 
fruitful basis for further investigations. 
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The aim of this thesis is to investigate the proof theory and semantics of various fragments of 
the logic for pragmatics proposed by Bellin and Dalla Pozza in [BD02]. We are dealing with 
a system that provides a so-called prescriptive account of deontic logic, i.e. one that takes as 
its basic assumption that norms or obligations are not simply used to state what ought to be the 
case but to bring about a certain state of affairs. In other words, the operator used to express the 
deontic modality cannot be treated in terms of a truth-functional semantics. In the remainder of 
this introductory chapter we shall give an account of the basic concepts of the logical framework, 
illustrated by means of an example, discuss some issues concerning the technical contributions 
of the present work, and provide a brief outline of the thesis. 
1.1 Sketch of basic intuitions 
One of the key ideas of the framework we are about to investigate is to employ a well known 
distinction endorsed by the theory of speech acts, namely the one between the pragmatic force of 
an utterance and its propositional content. 
Car chasing scenario To get an idea of what is going on let us introduce a simple example that 
allows us to illustrate the basic issues in a concrete case. Suppose that a police man enters a taxi 
and gives to the driver the following order: "Keep close to that red car!". Within this context 
one may deduce that if the driver of the red car speeds then the taxi driver must speed as well, 
i.e. one derives the obligation for the taxi driver to speed from the obligation of keeping close 
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to the red car, conditionally upon the fact that the red car speeds. As we shall argue below the 
fonnalisation of such a pattern of commonsense reasoning can naturally be done in the logical 
framework introduced by Bellin and Dalla Pozza in [BD02]. 
Obligations as prescriptions First of all, let us consider the utterance of the police officer. One 
should note that it is not a sentence in declarative mood but an imperative. As such it is impossible 
to assign a truth value to it, since the question of whether "Keep close to the red car!" is true 
or not simply does not apply. A way out is offered by speech act theory: one can decompose 
a speech act such as the above imperative into two separate parts, its force and its content. The 
content consists of a proposition p, i.e. in the example case we would have that p = taxi keeps 
close to red car, whereas the force tells us how the utterance has been used, for instance as the 
prescription to bring about the state of affairs described by p. Although one can assign truth 
values to propositions, it is not possible to do so for speech acts since truth values cannot be 
assigned to actions in general. Nevertheless, one can argue that speech acts are justified or not. 
If in the above example someone other than a police officer would have given the order then 
the taxi driver might take the derived obligation to speed as unjustified (and therefore not obey 
it) since an ordinary costumer does not have the authority to give such orders to him. Hence, 
considering j ustification values instead of truth values provides a reasonable starting point for the 
development of a prescriptive account of deontic logic. 
Declaratives as assertions It is worth mentioning that with respect to [BD02] we take it for 
granted that factual statements may be present in the derivation of an obligation from other obli-
gations, thus making it possible to consider also conditional obligations, i.e. obligations that are 
justified only if certain circumstances obtain. For instance, the obligation for the taxi driver to 
speed is justified conditionally upon the fact that the red car speeds. The general problem with 
factual statements is that we can assign truth values to them, thus threatening the assumption 
that the logical framework is based on justification values. Again, speech act theory provides 
a solution: declaratives are simply seen as speech acts that have the force of an assertion. To 
sum up, the key idea of the logic considered in this thesis is to have operators that allow one to 
express the pragmatic force of a proposition, thus providing a logical framework for dealing with 
acts of assertion and obligation. In other words, if propositional logic is conceived as the inves-
tigation of the abstract properties of natural language particles such as not, and, or, and entails 
then Bellin and Dalla Pozza's logic for pragmatics may be conceived as the investigation of the 
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ways in which certain utterances are used to do things. 
A logic/or pragmatics So far we have only seen the basic ingredients of the logical framework. 
To get a glimpse of the general picture it is worth to be more precise about the nature of justifi-
cation. As we have seen above justifications may depend heavily on context, e.g. an obligation 
may be justified or unjustified depending on the authority of the speaker. To get started it seems 
reasonable to consider only abstract speech acts, i.e. speech acts in which one abstracts away 
from the particular speech situation, thus leaving aside many of the aspects that playa major 
role in speech act theory and pragmatics. Although this limits the range of application it is still 
the case that the logical framework provides a good prescriptive account of deontic logic. With 
respect to assertions and obligations one has that 
1. the act of asserting the proposition p is justified if there is a formal proof or, outside math-
ematical contexts, some other kind of evidence showing that p is true, and unjustified 
otherwise; 
2. the act of setting the obligation to bring about the state of affairs described by p is justified 
if there is a proof showing that p holds in every rational normative system, and unjustified 
otherwise. 
Since both the justification of an assertion and an obligation depend crucially on the concept 
of proof one can simply exploit the well known Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of 
intuitionistic logic and therefore claim that the logical framework is essentially governed by the 
standard laws of propositional intuitionistic logic. 
Formalising the example We are now in the position to introduce an inference rule that allows 
one to derive the conclusion of the above example in a purely formal way. Let us suppose that the 
following list of propositions is provided: K = taxi keeps close to red car, Sr = red car speeds, 
St = taxi speeds. Then, given that K and Sr entail St (formally written as K, Sr =>c St) we can 
apply the inference rule 
to get that (K)O and Sr entail (Stt (formally written as (Kt, Sr =>d (Stt) where the operator 
(-t has the following intended reading: (p)O stands for the obligation to bring about the state 
of affairs described by p. Note that there are three important differences with respect to the usual 
modal rule of system KD, the standard modal system for deontic logic: (a) we are working in 
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an intuitionistic rather than a classical setting; (b) we are not forced to apply the modal oper-
ator (-t to all the formulae on the lefthand side of =>d, thus providing means to express the 
parameterisation of obligations by the deductive context of the modal rule; (c) we switch from 
the entailment relation =>c in the premise of the inference rule to the entailment relation =>d in 
its conclusion, thus getting a flat modality. Having a flat modality means that we cannot apply 
the modal operator ( - t more than one time. This restriction takes care of the requirement that 
prescriptive deontic modalities cannot be iterated. 
Causality and conditionals There are two further issues that need to be considered. First, in the 
formalisation of the example we have implicitly assumed that the entailment K, Sr =>c St can 
be treated as an axiom of the logical system. However, in [BD02], Bellin and Dalla Pozza put 
emphasis on the requirement that an obligation can be derived from other obligations only if in 
the premise of the inference rule the factual statements on the lefthand side of =>c are causally 
related to the the factual statement on its righthand side. In other words, one has to replace the 
entailment K, Sr =>c St by K, Sr, (K 0 Sr) S) St =>c St, thus making explicit the causal link 
between the factual statements. Note that, as an immediate consequence, the premise of the 
extended inference rule 
can be derived by means of the logical rules for the connectives 0 (relevant conjunction) and S) 
(causal implication). Second, as pointed out earlier it is very natural to think about the conclu-
sion of the inference in terms of conditionals. Hence, instead of letting the pararnetrisation of 
obligations be expressed only by the deductive context of the modal rule, we can introduce a new 
syntax for conditional obligations. From the conclusion of the above instance of the inference 
rule we can thus derive 
(K)O, Sr, (K 0 Sr) S) St =>d (St)O 
(K)O, (K 0 Sr) S) St =>d (St)OIl Sr 
where (St)O II Sr is justified only if the obligation (St t is justified conditionally upon the fact that 
the assertion Sr is justified. Note that by enhancing the logical framework with a new connective 
II for conditional implication we approach the investigation of an extension of the framework 
suggested by Dalla Pozza in the conclusion of [DaI97]. 
Further issues One should note that in this brief exposition we have only scratched the surface 
of a rather complex philosophical topic. A more in depth account of these issues that provides a 
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concise overview of the historical development of the project of a logic for pragmatics as well as 
pointers to the relevant literature can be found in chapter 2. 
1.2 Some technical background 
The main theme of the present work is the investigation of the modal rule introduced above 
from a proof-theoretical, type-theoretical, and semantic point of view. In this section, we shall 
first explain what is actually meant by this statement and then move on to dicuss the problems 
encountered along the way and motivate their solutions. 
Semantic aspects For a start it is worth reminding the reader of the work in [BR03]: it provides 
a Kripke-style semantics for the logic for pragmatics of Bellin and Dalla Pozza that is based on 
a translation of the logic into bimodal logic. Although this suffices to get a completeness result, 
it is more desirable to have a semantic analysis that does not depend on such a translation. In 
particular, getting a completeness result with respect to a categorical semantics provides means 
to regard other semantics as particular instances thereof. Indeed, later on we shall see a class 
of Kripke models that induce a particular class of categorical models, the so-called algebraic 
models. We might thus say that one of the motivations for the present work is the investigation 
of a semantics for the logic for pragmatics proposed by Bellin and Dalla Pozza that does avoid 
the shortcomings of the semantics considered in [BR03]. 
Syntactic aspects We have hinted at the fact that category theory provides us with a powerful 
tool that allows one to regard various models of a logic as particular instances of the general 
categorical semantics. The crucial issue here is that one has a close relationship between three 
different ways of looking at a logical framework from a proof-theoretical perspective, one of 
these being provided by category theory. The other ways are provided by logic and A-calculus. 
This is commonly called the extended Curry-Howard correspondence and the basic relations 
between the key concepts of each of the formalisms are summarised by the rows of the following 
table: 
logic A-calculus category theory 
formulae types objects 
derivations terms morphisms 
cut elimination reductions equality of morphisms 
1.2. Some technical background 14 
The Curry-Howard correspondence is so fundamental in theoretical computer science because 
it provides means to reason about functional programming language, i.e. suitable extensions 
of the >.-calculus, in tenns of logic, thus making it possible to replace infonna1 reasoning by 
fonnal arguments. Note, however, that we shall use the above table only as a guideline and rather 
look for a type-theoretical presentation of the logic for pragmatics: it is characterised by the 
fact that the distinctions between the various columns of the above table are somehow blurred. 
More precisely, a type theory consists of a natural deduction system where fonnulae or types 
are denoted by tenns together with a collection of equations between tenns that are induced by 
certain prooftransfonnations of the natural deduction system. 
Layered approach Since [BD02] considers only a sequent calculus system for the logic for 
pragmatics, a first obstacle that has to be removed is the lack of a natural deduction system. A 
key step towards the development of such a system is provided in [BR03] where one can find the 
observation that the derivations of the sequent calculus system given by Bellin and Dalla Pozza 
can all be brought in some sort of canonical fonn. We shall extend this idea and replace the 
double-context approach of[BD02] by an approach that is based on multiple entailment relations. 
Indeed, the design of the logic as a layered system mimics the definition of pragmatic language 
provided in the next chapter. As as consequence we have that one can almost immediately derive 
the natural deduction rules from the sequent calculus rules, thus making it possible to get a type-
theoretical presentation of the logic for pragmatics. It is worth pointing out that our approach is 
inspired by the work on linear and non-linear logic (see for instance [Ben94] or [MMdPROS]) 
and the logic of linear functors (see for instance [BCS02]). 
On the modal rule As mentioned above, the techniques used to investigate and study natural 
deduction systems for constructive modal logics (see for instance [BeI8S] and [BdPRO 1]) can be 
adapted in a straightforward manner to the case of the modal rule considered in the previous sec-
tion. However, whereas one can adapt the standard categorical machinery for most of the rules, 
this is not anymore the case for the modal rule. The usual categorical approach to modalities 
(at least if one is interested in modelling proofs rather than provability) consists in providing an 
endofunctor with certain extra structure such as, for instance, strength. But since we have a flat 
modality that cannot be iterated an arbitrary number oftimes this approach is doomed to fail. Al-
though flat modalities arise if one breaks the monoidal adjunction in categorical models for linear 
and non-linear logic (see for instance [Epp03]), we shall rather follow the lead of [MdPROO] and 
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provide an approach that is based on split lB-indexed categories, i.e. functors from lBop to Cat, 
the category of small categories. The key observation is that the so-called parameters of the 
modal rule remain unaltered, thus suggesting to use them as the objects of the base category lB. 
As we shall see later on the two morphisms representing the derivation of the premise and the 
derivation of the conclusion of the rule can be obtained as the images of two functors from lBop 
to SCat, the category of small semi-categories or categories without identity morphisms. It is 
worth pointing out that every category can be regarded as a semi-category. Thus, we simply use 
a slightly more general variant of the standard definition of split indexed category. As a conse-
quence the modal rule can be interpreted as a natural transformation between these two functors, 
i.e. as a morphism of generalised split indexed categories. 
Outline of the thesis As remarked at the end of the previous section, in chapter 2 we provide 
a gentle introduction to the basic philosophical ideas underlying this thesis. The main goals of 
chapter 2 are to elaborate in more detail the philosophical issues sketched above and to give a for-
mal definition of pragmatic language. Note that we distinguish three fragments of the pragmatic 
language: the basic causal-deontic fragment, the extended causal-deontic fragment, and the full 
intuitionistic fragment. This allows us to present the technical work in a more modular fashion. 
Most of the remaining chapters are concerned with the basic causal-deontic fragment, i.e. the 
smallest fragment incorporating the modal rule, its investigation being carried out in chapters 
3, 4, 5, and 6. Chapters 3 and 4 serve the purpose to provide some intuitions about the basic 
causal-deontic fragment of the logic for pragmatics, both from a proof-theoretical and a semantic 
point of view. In chapter 3 we introduce a sequent calculus system for the logic and show that 
it satisfies the cut elimination property. In chapter 4 we introduce a Kripke semantics and show 
that it is sound and complete with respect to the sequent calculus system. Chapters 5 and 6 are 
the most fundamental ones of the thesis. In chapter 5 we introduce a type theory for the basic 
causal-deontic fragment of the logic for pragmatics that is derived from the sequent calculus pre-
sentation of the system. In chapter 6 we introduce a sound and complete class of categorical 
models and investigate how the Kripke semantics fits into the abstract framework. Having thus 
completed the investigation ofthe basic causal-deontic fragment, we set out in chapters 7 and 8 
to explain how similar results can be obtained both for the extended causal-deontic and the full 
intuitionistic fragment of the logic for pragmatics. In chapter 7 we deal with the extended causal-
deontic system and show how the definitions of the previous chapters have to be adapted in order 
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to support the concept of conditional obligation or hypothetical nonn in the logical framework. In 
chapter 8 we deal with the full intuitionistic system and show how the original system of [BD02] 
is related to the system considered in this thesis. To sum up, one might say that we provide a new 
presentation of the original system with a well-behaved semantics that can naturally be enhanced 
with a concept of conditional obligation. We conclude the thesis with some reflections about 




The project of a logic for pragmatics is based on a wealth of philosophical ideas. To make these 
ideas more accessible we briefly sketch the historical development of the project with the aim to 
introduce the important concepts step-by-step, thus providing a concise overview of the general 
framework. In short, the main feature of the logic for pragmatics are operators that allow one 
to express explicitly the force with which a sentence is uttered. In particular, we are interested 
in sentences or utterances that have the force of an assertion or obligation, consider issues that 
arise when one tries to relate impersonal acts of assertion and impersonal acts of obligation via 
a notion of causal implication, and show that the framework can naturally be enhanced with a 
notion of conditional obligation. 
2.1 Towards a logic for pragmatics 
Based on ideas from Frege's philosophy oflanguage and ordinary language philosophy, in partic-
ular speech act theory, the project of a logic for pragmatics, originated by the philosopher Carlo 
Dalla Pozza, proposes a formal apparatus that allows one to integrate various logics within the 
same conceptual framework. 
Propositions vs. judgements A cornerstone in the development of philosophy of language is 
Frege's investigation of aspects related to the concept of thought or, to put it in the terminology 
of modem logic, proposition. 
Wir unterscheiden [ ... ]: 
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1. das Fassen des Gedankens - das Denken, 
2. die Anerkennung der Wahrheit eines Gedankens - das Urteilen, 
3. die Kundgebung dieses Urteils - das Behaupten.l [Fre 19, p. 62] 
For Frege the apprehension of a thought or proposition 0 roughly corresponds to asking the 
question of whether it is the case that 0 or, equivalently, that 0 is true. In general, one does not 
know the answer to such a question a priori; rather one has to go through some sort of process that 
provides means to judge whether 0 is true. Indeed, in scientific or mathematical discourse such 
means consist of empirical or formal proofs, respectively. Therefore, only if one has some sort 
of evidence, perhaps in form of an empirical or mathematical proof, in support of the proposition 
0, one can assert its truth. In his early work Frege even introduces special signs to distinguish 
between these aspects in his graphical language (see for instance the discussion in [SL95, pp. 29-
35]): he uses - 0 to denote the content of an assertion, and r 0 to denote the assertion itself. The 
conceptual shift from propositions to judgements is thus symbolised by putting a vertical stroke 
in front of the content sign. 
Speech act theory Analogous ideas can be found in the theory of speech acts, a branch of 
pragmatics heavily influenced by Austin's ordinary language philosophy. Austin's basic insight is 
that there are cases in which ''to say something is" not "always and simply to state something" but 
rather ''to do something" [Aus76, p. 12]. Indeed, take for example the paradigmatic case where 
ajudge declares 'I sentence you to ten years of prison' and the effects caused by this declaration. 
In particular, Austin considers ''the senses in which to say something is to do something" [Aus76, 
p. 121] and distinguishes 
the locutionary act [ ... ] which has a meaning; the ilIocutionary act which has a 
certainforce in saying something; the perlocutionary act which is the achieving of 
certain effects by saying something. [Aus76, p. 121] 
It is intended that to perform a locution or locutionary act is "roughly equivalent to uttering a 
certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which [ ... ] is roughly equivalent to 'mean-
ing' in the traditional sense" [Aus76, p. 109]. Within this context speech act theory is mainly 
1 This may be translated as follows. 
[ ... J we may distinguish: 
(1) the apprehension of a thought - thinking, 
(2) the recognition of the truth of a thought - judgement, 
(3) the manifestation of this judgement - assertion. [Fre56, p. 294J 
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concerned with the study of ilIocutions or ilIocutionary acts, broadly understood as "the making 
of a statement, offer, promise, etc. in uttering a sentence, by virtue of the conventional force 
associated with it" [Lev83, p. 236]. The main feature of the concept of illocution is that one can 
make explicit the force with which a sentence is uttered, thus providing means to detach the force 
of an utterance from its content. 
[ ... ] the distinction between illocutionary force and propositional content can in 
fact be found in [ ... ] Frege. Frege himself placed considerable emphasis on the 
distinction between the ''thought'' or proposition, and its assertion or '~udgement" 
as true. [Lev83, p. 242] 
As in Frege's graphical language for assertions a speech act can therefore be regarded as a propo-
sition a endowed with a pragmatic operator (such as for example 1-) indicating the force or prag-
matic mode of the proposition. 
Justification values Another crucial aspect of Austin's work are the so-called felicity condi-
tions: they provide means to detennine whether an illocution or speech act is perfonned suc-
cessfully. There are various kinds of conditions to consider and [Aus76] provides a full account 
(see also [Lev83, section 5.1]). Instead of going into the details let us just point out that, roughly 
speaking, they serve the purpose to guarantee that the speech act under consideration takes place 
in favourable circumstances and that it follows some specific procedure, usually established by 
convention. However, if one takes seriously the idea to develop a logic for pragmatics conceived 
as a logic of speech acts then one has to be clear about how the felicity conditions are tied to the 
logical framework. Dalla Pozza's logic for pragmatics is based on two assumptions that can be 
traced back to the work ofFrege. First, only impersonal speech acts, i.e. speech acts in which one 
abstracts away from the particular speech situation, are considered. As a consequence the prag-
matic operator I- seen above is interpreted as either 'the assertion that -' or 'asserting that -' 
but not as 'some speaker asserts that -.' That it is reasonable to start from such an assumption 
also follows from the type/token distinction: for, impersonal speech acts should be regarded as 
types, and ordinary speech acts as tokens.2 Second, speech acts are actions and as such they can 
be either justified or unjustified, i.e. they can be endowed with a justification value. The rela-
tionship between felicity conditions and justification values may then be expressed as follows: 
impersonal speech acts are felicitous or perfonned successfully only if they are justified. There-
2The idea that one can appeal to the type/token distinction was originally proposed by Graham White. 
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fore, to be justified is a necessary condition for a speech act, may it be impersonal or not, to be 
felicitous. To establish under which conditions certain kinds of speech acts are justified is one of 
the main tasks of the logic. 
A logic o/judgements Starting from the above assumptions and the commonly accepted fact 
that classical logic is the logic of propositions, Dalla Pozza sets out in [DaI91, D095] to develop 
his basic account of a logic for pragmatics. It is best to recall the distinction between propositions 
and judgements discussed above. A proposition or formula in classical logic a is defined by the 
following grammar: 
a := p 11.1...., a I a 1\ a I a Val a -+ a 
As usual, p ranges over the set of atomic propositions and propositions are interpreted according 
to their standard truth-functional semantics. A judgement or assertion is the recognition of the 
truth of a proposition and as such it cannot be endowed with a truth value. But, as we have 
seen above, we can assign a justification value to it and hence the question of whether there is a 
logic of judgements in which justification values play the same role as truth values in classical 
logic arises. Dalla Pozza thesis is that there is such a logic and that it is governed by the laws of 
intuitionistic logic. For, an impersonal act of assertion f- a is justified if and only ifthere exists a 
proof (which depending on context may either be empirical or mathematical) of the proposition 
a. Therefore, the connectives of the logic of judgements can be interpreted in terms of proofs: 
for instance, that f- a1 entails f- a2 is justified if and only ifthere exists a method that transforms a 
justification off- aI, i.e. a proof of aI, into ajustification off- a2, i.e. a proof of a2; and similarly 
for the other connectives. In other words, starting from Frege's insight that judgements and 
assertions belong to the same subject matter one can exploit the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov 
interpretation of intuitionistic logic to provide an informal semantics for the logic of judgements. 
To sum up, the logic of judgements can be regarded as an extension of the logic of propositions 
defined by the following grammar: 
TJ := f- a o := TJ IJ I U Ion 818 u 818 ::> 8 
In Dalla Pozza's terminology a formula 8 is called sentential.3 Sentential formulae are obtained 
from the class of so-called elementary (sentential) formulae TJ and the logical constants J and 
3Dalla Pozza actually uses the term assertive formula in [DG95]. However, when he considers a 
second pragmatic operator or sign of pragmatic mode for deontic modality in [Da197] he introduces the 
term sententialformula instead and distinguishes between assertive and normative sentential formulae. 
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U by applying the pragmatic connectives n, U, and :::) standing for intuitionistic conjunction, 
disjunction, and implication, respectively . .]', the act of assertion that is always justified, and 
U, the act of assertion that is never justified, are the units for n and U, respectively. In the 
basic account of the logic the class of elementary formulae consists only of impersonal acts 
of assertion; we shall see below that it can be extended with other kinds of speech acts. An 
elementary formula f- 0: is characterised by the property that it detaches the operator f- indicating 
the pragmatic mode from the proposition or, to put in Dalla Pozza's terminology, radical part 0:. 
Elementary formulae bridge the gap between the logic of propositions, representing essentially 
semantic aspects of language, and the logic of judgements, representing essentially pragmatic 
aspects of language. 
On the unity 0/ logiC Dalla Pozza's basic account of a logic for pragmatics enables one to draw 
some important philosophical conclusions. First, since sentential formulae have a justification 
value one can define a concept of pragmatic validity for the logic of judgements that naturally 
extends the concept of validity for classical logic (see for instance [DG95, section 3]). Second, 
both classical and intuitionistic propositional logic can be considered as subsystems of the logic. 
This is achieved by restricting the class of sentential formulae to the class of elementary formulae 
.,., for classical logic and to the class of sentential formulae obtained from elementary formulae of 
the form f- p only for intuitionistic logic. The logic can thus be regarded as a unifying framework 
where both classical and intuitionistic logic can coexist, the main reason being that classical 
logic, seen as the logic of propositions, and intuitionistic logic, seen as the logic of judgements, 
have a different subject matter. Third, it is possible to provide a link between the pragmatic 
and the semantic level of the logic via the GOdel-McKinsey-Tarski interpretation of intuitionistic 
logic in the classical modal logic 84. To do so one extends the class of radical formulae 0: with 
an operator 0 obeying the laws of 84: 
Note that the intended reading of the classical modal operator 0 is 'it is provable that -.' One 
can then translate a sentential formula 8 into the radical formulae 8* by iterated application of 
the following translation schemes: 
J* = -.1. U* = 1. (I- 0:)* = Do: 
(01 U 02)* = (8i V O2) (01 :::) 02)* = 0 (8i -+ 82) 
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The existence of such an embedding of sentential formulae into the class of radical formulae is 
called the reflection principle of the logic for pragmatics. The reflection principle enables one 
to give a so-called descriptive reading to ilIocutions or speech acts. For instance, the descriptive 
reading of 'the assertion that -' is 'it is provable that -.' The upshot is that the reflection 
principle provides means to pin down formally the close relationship between the concepts of 
assertion and proof introduced by Frege. 
The concept 0/ obligation Dalla Pozza concludes his basic account of a logic for pragmatics 
with some remarks on possible further developments of the conceptual framework. In particular, 
he proposes that 
[ ... J the apparatus oflogical-pragmatic signs [ ... J could be enriched by introducing 
[ ... ] further signs of pragmatic mode, such as [ ... ] deontic modality; consequently 
the apparatus of the pragmatic formulas could be extended in such a way that also 
[ ... ] deontic logic (understood as the logic of normative, or prescriptive, sentences 
and not as the logic of norm-descriptive sentences, or normative propositions) can 
be embodied into the pragmatic language [ ... ] [DG95, p. 104] 
And he sets out to do so in [DaI97]. From a syntactic point of view it suffices to extend the class 
of elementary formulae TJ with the pragmatic operator 0- for deontic modality that is interpreted 
as 'the obligation to -.' Therefore, the extended class of sentential formulae is defined by the 
following grammar: 
TJ := f- a 1 0- a 8 := TJ 1 ] 1 U 18 n 818 u 818 ~ 8 
Contrary to the case for assertions one has that an act of obligation or norm 0- a is always 
impersonal. The justification of a norm is done in two steps: first, one defines what it means to 
be justified with respect to some specific normative system N; second, one abstracts away from 
the particular normative system. By a normative system one simply understands a collection 
of obligations and permissions where the pragmatic operator p (interpreted as 'the permission 
to -') is defined in terms of 0- as follows: 
One has that an act of obligation 0- a is justified with respect to a normative system N if and 
only ifthere is a proof that (a) 0- a satisfies the specific conditions for membership in N, (b) a is 
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the description of an act or action, (c) 0 is physically possible, and (d) 0 is logically compatible 
with every 0' that occurs in either an obligation 0- a' or a permission p a' of N. In other words, 
the justification of an obligation or norm with respect to some specific normative system N is 
based on four necessary conditions: (a) existence, (b) content, (c) satisfiability, and (d) compati-
bility. Furthermore, the requirement that there exists a proof showing that these conditions hold 
introduces a strong criterion of rationality that enables one to recognise a norm that is logically 
entailed by a set of justified norms as justified. One then has that an act of obligation 0- 0 is 
justified if and only if it is justified with respect to every normative system. Note that the concept 
of pragmatic validity carries over without further modifications. 
A logic 0/ norms Having extended the framework of a logic of judgements or assertions with the 
concept of obligation, Dalla Pozza is then able to tackle the fundamental philosophical problem 
of norms, i.e. the problem of whether there is a logic of norms. Put in simple terms, the nucleus 
of the problem is that a norm is usually regarded as a prescription to bring or to not bring about a 
certain state of affairs and as such cannot be endowed with a truth value. In other words, classical 
logic can be conceived as a logic of norms only if norms are regarded as norm-descriptive rather 
than as prescriptive sentences. Dalla Pozza thesis is that there is a logic of norms where norms 
are not regarded as norm-descriptive sentences, namely the logic of judgements endowed with a 
pragmatic operator for obligation: the argument is essentially based on the fact that the concept 
of pragmatic validity extends to norms as well. Instead of providing a detailed account of all 
the philosophical conclusions that follow from the thesis (see for instance [DaI97]) let us just 
point out how the reflection principle can be extended to the logic of judgements and norms. As 
above, one considers an extended class of radical formulae 0 and a translation scheme for the 
new pragmatic operator:4 
o := p 1.11..., 0 1 0 1\ 0 1 0 Vol 0 -+ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 (0-0)*=000 
The intended reading of the classical modal operator 0 obeying the laws ofKD is 'it is obligatory 
to -' and so the descriptive reading of 'the obligation to -' is 'it is provable that it is obligatory 
to -.' Here again, the reflection principle exhibits the close relationship that holds between 
norms and their justification. It is worth mentioning that the elementary formulae 0- 0 and f- (00) 
are equivalent with respect to the translation scheme. The equivalence is best explained in terms 
of the various interpretations that might be given to an obligation sign. Indeed, a 'no smoking' 
4The translation scheme was actually introduced by Gianluigi Bellin and the present author in [BR03]. 
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sign for example may be rendered either as 'the obligation to not smoke' or as 'the assertion that 
it is obligatory to not smoke', and both readings are plausible from a common-sense perspective. 
However, 0- a denotes a norm and is thus different from I- (0 a) which denotes an assertion, i.e. 
0- a cannot be identified with I- ( 0 a). 
Some related work We conclude this section with a few pointers to related work where other 
pragmatic operators or signs of pragmatic mode have been considered within the framework 
of a logic for pragmatics. Most notably, Bellin and Biasi have investigated the possibility of 
a logic for pragmatics with assertions and conjectures (see for instance [BB04] and [BA08]). 
Furthermore, Dalla Pozza has outlined an extension of the basic account dealing with questions 
in a presentation at the University of Verona in the autumn of2003. 
2.2 Causality and hypothetical norms 
Starting from the logic of judgements and norms Bellin and Dalla Pozza investigate whether it is 
possible to give a pragmatic interpretation of linear logic, thus extending the framework with a 
concept of causality. We further enhance the framework by introducing a concept of conditional 
obligation or hypothetical norm. 
Notational conventions Before we start with the exposition of the main ideas let us introduce 
some new notation. We set TJa =def I- a and TJ~ =def 0- a. The class of sentential formulae is 
thus defined as follows: 
8 := TJ I ] I U Ion 818 U 0 I 0 ::) 0 
The use of meta-variables instead of pragmatic operators or signs of pragmatic mode has several 
reasons. First, it simply makes the formal systems that will be considered in this thesis more 
readable and thus helps to avoid needless confusion. Second, it provides a neat graphical way to 
symbolise the shift from an assertion with content a to an obligation with content a that we shall 
see below. Third and most importantly, the (-t operator can be seen as an abstract operator, 
thus making it possible to postpone decisions about possible interpretations. As we shall see at 
the end of this section one can specialise this operator in such a way that hypothetical norms can 
be interpreted in terms of it. 
The concept of causality One of the aims of [BD02] is to provide a well-behaved mixed system 
that formalises reasoning about assertions and obligations, presented in terms of sequent calculus 
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rules. Of particular interest is a principle that lets interact acts of assertion and obligation via a 
notion of causal implication. To put it in Anscombe's words, "the topic of causality is in a state of 
too great confusion" [AnsOO, p. 10], and Bellin and Dalla Pozza take great care to make explicit 
their basic assumptions. First of all, one has that causal links are established only between acts 
of assertions, thus making it possible to give them a justification in terms of scientific laws. 
Indeed, if D stands for causal implication then TJal D TJa2 is justified if and only if there exists 
some scientific law Vx.cp(x) -+ 'IjJ(x) and some term t such that Ql = cp(t) and Q2 = 'IjJ(t). It 
is worth pointing out that the universal quantifier is used in a semi-formal way: the basic idea 
is that a scientific law is considered as some general pattern that holds universally and that a 
causal implication is justified if it can be regarded as an instance of it. The justification of a 
causal implication is thus extensional, i.e. it depends only on the existence of the scientific law 
and the justification of TJal' As an immediate consequence of extensionality one has that causal 
implication has its intended meaning only in positive occurrences, i.e. in causal formulae of 
the form TJal D (TJa2 D ( ... D ("Ian DTJa) ... )). The extended class of sentential formulae is thus 
defined as follows: 
a := TJ~ 1 ~ I] 1 U Ion a lou a 1 a :) a 
Note that assertive elementary formulae TJa are absorbed by the new class of pure causal formulae 
~ and normative elementary formulae TJ~ by the class of sentential formulae O. One might wonder 
whether there are any causal links between acts of obligation: these are established indirectly via 
the sequent calculus rule 
which we have already encountered in the previous chapter. Another important aspect besides 
extensionality is that the formulae in the antecedent of the sequent have to be relevant with 
respect to the formula in the succedent. This is achieved by admitting only the structural rule of 
contraction but not the weakening rule. 
Comments and remarks Since the main theme of this thesis is the study of the (-t rule from 
a proof-theoretical and semantic perspective it is worth having a closer look at it. As already 
mentioned in the introduction the rule can be regarded as a parametrised version of the K rule 
familiar from modal logic. Note however that, as a consequence of the fact that there is a change 
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of inference relation, one has only a flat modality. This is in accordance with the basic require-
ment that signs of pragmatic mode cannot be iterated. The purpose of the rule is to transform 
assertive (elementary) formulae in the antecedent and the succedent of a sequent into normative 
(elementary) formulae, thus providing means to make a shift from assertions to obligations. Note 
that in contrast to [BD02] we do not require that each parameter ~i is a causal implication, i.e. it 
might be the case that some parameter ~i is an assertive (elementary) formula. This can lead to 
violations of Hume's law which says that one cannot derive an ought from an is. Indeed, con-
sider an instance of the above rule where n = 0: in this case there is no normative (elementary) 
formula in the antecedent of the conclusion. We shall return to this important issue when we 
specialise the (_)0 operator at the end of this section. 
Commutativity and events The attentive reader will have noticed that we have only talked about 
the presence or not of the structural rules of weakening and contraction in the sequent calculus 
presentation of the (_)0 rule. In the light of the difficulties that arise when one considers non-
commutative logics Bellin and Dalla Pozza make the simplifying assumption that one admits the 
structural rule of exchange. Formally, we have that 
where'" stands for interderivability and 0 for relevant conjunction (see for instance [ResOO]). 
Note that with respect to [BD02] we have thus introduced the connective o. There are basically 
two reasons for this choice. First, from a semantic point of view it is desirable to have a so-called 
left adjoint to causal implication. It allows one to consider the commas in the antecedent of a 
sequent as conjunctions, thus simplifying the definition of the interpretation of the logic in the 
semantics. Second, although the informal interpretation of causal implication is based on a re-
duction to a truth-functional or descriptive condition the concept of causality by itself establishes 
a link between events. In particular, the interpretation of causality in terms of conditional prob-
abilities (see for instance [PeaOO]) is based on the idea that a certain number of distinct events 
occurring in the same spatiotemporal region are necessary to trigger some other event. The new 
class of causal-deontic formulae "y is defined as follows: 
fJ := fJe> I € I fJ 0 fJ e := fJ I fJ £) e leo e 
Note that this is simply a refinement of the above grammar where we have introduced the relevant 
conjunction 0 and its unit €. It is worth mentioning that the event reading of relevant conjunction 
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applies only to the class of assertive formulae TJ; relevant conjunctions of causal-deontic formulae 
where at least one of the subformulae is not an assertive formula TJ have been mainly introduced 
for the abovementioned technical reasons. 
Relation to linear logic The investigation in [BD02] culminates with a series of translation 
schemes that aim to show that the linear entailment relation expresses the deductive properties 
of pragmatic schemes where the pragmatic operators are unknown and their specification is not 
required to be uniform. Instead of going into the details of the argument we rather focus on 
the relation between linear implication and causality. Girard's analysis [Gir87, Gir95] of intu-
itionistic implication in terms of linear implication A :::> B = !A -0 B becomes implausible 
if A -0 B is given a strict causal interpretation. Although linear implication may sometimes 
admit a causal interpretation, it is more appropriately regarded as an abstract construction. In-
deed, in accordance with the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation of intuitionistic logic 
mentioned above a justification of TJl :J TJ2 is provided by a method that transforms a proof of 'f]1 
into a proof of "l2; but it would seem odd to claim that a causal component can always be iden-
tified within such a method. However, the informal interpretation of causal implication given 
above and hence the syntactic restrictions on causal implication imposed by it allow one to show 
that there is a close connection between causal implications and so-called Horn implications, i.e. 
linear logic formulae of the form (PI ® ... ® Pn) -0 (ql ® ... ® qm) where Pi and qj are atomic 
propositions (see for instance [Kan94]). Since the formal argument requires a bit of proof theory 
it is postponed until the next chapter (see remark 3.1.4). 
On conditional obligation As mentioned at the beginning of this section we shall now see how 
the (-t operator can be specialised in such a way that hypothetical norms can be interpreted in 
terms of it. The key point is to observe that this can be done by introducing a new grammar for TJo. 
As pointed out in [DaI97] one is interested in a new connective /I that provides means to relate 
obligations to assertions is such a way that TJ2//'f]1 supports the following informal interpretation: 
TJ2 is justified conditionally upon the fact that TJl is justified. However, there is a significant 
difference between assertions and obligations that needs to be taken into account, namely that 
the justification of an assertion does not explicitly depend on its content whereas the justification 
of an obligation does. Remember that the content condition is one of the four conditions listed 
in the definition of justification of an obligation or norm with respect to some specific normative 
system N: it says that the content a of an obligation can only be the description of an act or 
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action. Therefore one can safely introduce the restriction that a normative elementary formula 
17~ is well-defined only if a.satisfies the content condition, i.e. only if a describes an act or 
action. In order to be able to express this restriction in a succinct way we use Q to denote the 
set of radical formulae a that satisfy the content condition. The extended class of causal-deontic 
formulae is then defined as follows: 
If we use rad (17) to denote the set of radical formulae occurring in an assertive formula 17 then we 
have that the (-t operator can only be applied to assertive formulae 17 where rad(17) is a non-
empty subset of Q. Thus, it cannot be applied to the assertive formulae €. Since in the semantics 
considered below the ( - ) 0 operator is interpreted as a map from the interpretation of an assertive 
formula 17 to the interpretation ofthe normative formula 17° we have that one cannot interpret the 
conclusion of an ( - t rule 
when n = 0, the reason being simply that one would have to apply the (_)0 operator to €. In 
other words, the grammar for 17° naturally reflects the fact that Hume's law cannot be violated .. 
Furthermore, since rad(171 07/2) = rad(171) U rad(172), we have that (7/1 0172)° is well-defined 
whenever both 17'1 and 172 are. We can thus make the simplifying assumption that the (-t 
operator distributes over the relevant conjunction 0, i.e. that ("71 0 "72t ,...., 171 0172 where, as 
above, '" stands for interderivability. 
2.3 Definition of pragmatic language 
To sum up, we conclude this chapter with the formal definition of pragmatic language. One 
should note that we focus on the so-called intuitionistic fragment where the radical part a consists 
only of atomic propositions p. As above, we use Q to denote the set of atomic propositions that 
may be the content of an obligation. 
Definition 2.3.1 Thefull intuitionistic fragment.c.~ of the pragmatic language is defined by the 
following grammar: 
1. Assertive formulae 17 := 17p 1 € 117 0 17; 
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2. Pure causal formulae ~ := '" I", D ~ leo e; 
3. Causal-deontic formulae , := ",0 I e 1,0,; 
4. Sentential formulae 8:=, I] I U 18 n 818 u 818 :::> 8. 
We shall use .c~ to denote the basic causa/-dean tic fragment of .c~, i.e. the fragment of .c~ that 
does not contain sentential formulae 8. Further, we shall use .ck to denote the extended causa/-
deantic, i.e. the basic causal-deontic fragment.c~ of .c~ with normative formulae ",0 defined by 
the grammar "'~ 1",011", 1",0 0 ",0 where p ranges over the set Q. 
Remark 2.3.2 Since we deal with radical formulae a of the form p only, i.e. neglect the fact 
that propositions a actually obey the laws of classical logic, we have to do with an intuitionstic 
framework. Let us point out that this is also the reason why we call the language defined by the 
above grammar the full intuitionistic fragment of the pragmatic language. 
Remark 2.3.3 We shall use ii, 3, r, and ~ to denote multisets of assertive, pure causal, causal-
deontic, and sentential formulae, respectively. As a consequence of the definition of pragmatic 
language, one has that ii ~ 3 ~ r ~ 6. where ~ stands for multi set inclusion. Furthermore, 




We start our technical investigation with a sequent calculus system for the basic causal-deontic 
fragment of the pragmatic language defined in the previous chapter, one of the reasons being 
that a sequent calculus system for the logic for pragmatics has also been given in [BD02]. It is 
worth pointing out, however, that our presentation of the rules differs in many ways from the 
one provided by Bellin and Dalla Pozza and that a comparison of the two systems is postponed 
to chapter 8. The main aim of this chapter is to introduce the rules of the system and to show 
that the system satisfies the cut elimination property. As we shall see in chapter 5, the reductions 
used in the proof of cut elimination provide a rationale for deciding whether two derivations are 
essentially the same. It is worth reminding the reader that in this and the next three chapters we 
deal only with the basic causal-deontic system, the treatment of the extended causal-deontic and 
full intuitionistic systems being postponed to chapters 7 and 8. 
3.1 The basic causaI-deontic system 
The key feature of the sequent calculus system provided in this section is that it is split into 
three fragments, each corresponding to one of the layers of the basic causal-deontic fragment £h 
of the pragmatic language given in definition 2.3.1 and each being characterised by one of the 
entailment relations ::}a, ::}e, and ::}d. The use of several entailment relations is inspired by the 
work on linear and non-linear logic in [Ben94, MMdPR05] and the work on the logic of linear 
functors in [BCS02]. The basic causal-deontic rules are provided in figure 3.1. Note that most 
of these correspond to standard rules of the multiplicative fragment of intuitionistic linear logic 
----ax 
TJp *a TJp 
fj *a TJ ----c,€ 
€, fj *a TJ 
,',/',r *x "'I 
-----con 
,',r *x, 
,1, ,2, r *x , C, 0 
,1 0 'Y2,r*x, 
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~*a TJ (a/c) 
TJ *c TJ 
r 1 *x ,1 r 2 *x "'12 
--------1?-0 
rl, r 2 *x ,1 0,2 
Figure 3.1: Basic causal-deontic rules 
(see for instance [Bie94]) endowed with the contraction rule. 
Remark 3.1.1 In order to avoid writing down several instances of analogous cases, we find it 
convenient to use the notation r *x ,for sequents with an indetenninate entailment relation, the 
particular instance of *x being detennined by the fonnulae in the antecedent and the consequent 
of the sequent. Note that, without further mention, we shall use this notational convention also 
for other fonnalisations of the basic-causal deontic system. 
Remark 3.1.2 Both the (a/c) and (c/d) rules serve the purpose to embed certain fragments of 
the basic causal-deontic system into other fragments of the system. In particular, we have that 
1.' the assertive fragment is included in the pure causal fragment; 
2. the pure causal fragment is included in the causal-deontic fragment. 
This feature of the logic is a direct consequence of the multiset inclusion ij ~ S ~ r mentioned 
at the end of the previous chapter and can succinctly be expressed as =?a ~ =?c ~ *d, a series 
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of inclusions of entailment relations. 
Remark 3.1.3 In the CD and 'RD rules the antecedent of the causal implication is restricted to 
assertive formulae only. As pointed out in chapter 2 the reason for such a choice is that we want 
the justification of a causal implication to be extensional. 
Remark 3.1.4 The pure causal system, i.e. the fragment without sequents of the form r =>d 'Y, 
can be related to the Horn fragment of linear logic (see for instance [Kan94]) dealing only with 
the connectives ® and -0. On the one hand we have that relevant conjunctions may 'absorb' 
causal implications: 
'T/2 =>c: 'T/2 ~ =>c ~ 
--------CD 
'T/l =>c 'T/l 'T/2, 'T/2 D ( :::}c ~ 
------------ CD 
'T/l,'T/2,'T/1 D ('T/2 D ():::}c ( 
---------- Co 
'T/l 0 'T/2, 'T/l D ('T/2 D () :::}c: ~ 
-----------'RD 
'T/l D ('T/2 D () :::}c: ('T/l 0 'T/2) D ~ 
On the other hand we have that relevant conjunctions may 'distribute' over causal implications:! 
'T/l =>c 'T/l 6 :::}c 6 r 'T/2 =>c: 'T/2 6 =>c: (2 r 
-,-,D -,-,D 
'T/l,'T/l D 6 =>c: 6 'T/2,'T/2 D 6 =>c 6 no 
'T/lt'T/2,'T/1 D 6,'T/2 D 6 =>c 6 0 6 
============= Co 
'T/l 0 'T/2, ('T/l D {d 0 ('T/2 D 6) =>c 6 0 6 
----------------- 'RD 
('T/l D {I) 0 ('T/2 D 6) =>c ('T/l 0 'T/2) D (6 06) 
These two properties taken together allow one to derive a sequent Se = (( =>c ('T/i") D ('T/t)) 
for each pure causal formula ~ where 'T/i" (resp. 'T/t> denotes the relevant conjunction of all the 
assertive formulae 'T/ with negative (resp. positive) occurrence in {; the straightforward proof 
by induction on the complexity of ~ is omitted. As a consequence, a derivation of the sequent 
'T/l, •.•• 'T/n. {I, •.. , ~m :::}c 'T/ where each {i contains at least one causal implication can be trans-
formed into a derivation 
(HLL + con) 
Sem 
- + - + 'T/l 0 ••• 0 'T/n, 'T/el D 'T/el' .•• , 'T/em D "'em =>c 'T/ 
===============================================cut 
lThroughout the thesis we shall use the convention that whenever there are several consecutive in-
stances of some rule in a derivation we indicate it by using a double line instead of the usual single line. 
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in Horn linear logic HLL (see [Kan94, table 3 on p. 204]) extended with an axiom scheme Sf; 
and the structural rule of contraction. Note that restricting the consequent of the sequent to an 
assertive formula can be done without loss of generality: it is straightforward to show that if 
S =>c e is derivable in sequent calculus then so is rli, S ::}c "'t. 
Remark 3.1.5 Of crucial importance is the (_)0 rule already seen in the previous chapters: it 
formalises the propagation of obligations or norms through causal chains of assertions. Note that, 
analogously to the (c I d) rule, it transforms a sequent of the pure causal fragment of the system 
into a sequent of the causal-deontic fragment. 
Definition 3.1.6 The depth "I of a causal-deontic formula I is defined inductively as follows: 
3. I", ~ ~I = max(I",I, I~I) + 1; 





are admissible in the basic causal-deontic system. 
r::}X I ---c€ 
€, r::}x I 
Proof We consider only an instance of the generalised axiom rule. Given that -< denotes the 
standard ascending order on the letters of the alphabet, the proof is then by induction on the 
ordered pair (III, x) where x ranges over the set {a, c, d}. The most interesting cases are the 
following ones: 
1. The axiom 
is replaced by 
---ax 
'" ::}c '" 
---ax 
"'::}a'" (a/c) 
'" ::}c '" 
and, since a -< c, the induction hypothesis applies. 
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2. The axiom 




e ~c e (c/d) 
~~d e 
and, since c -< d, the induction hypothesis applies. 
3. The axiom 
is replaced by 
and, since 1771 < 177°1, the induction hypothesis applies. o 
Theorem 3.1.8 (cut elimination) If a sequent f ~x 'Y is derivable according to the rules of 
figure 3.1 then it has a cut-free derivation. 
3.2 Proof of cut elimination theorem 
If the derivation off ~x 'Y in theorem 3.1.8 is not already cut-free, then the proof proceeds by 
iterated application oflemma 3.2.3 below to the top-most cut in the proofiree, thus reducing the 
number of cuts by one at each iteration. 
Definition 3.2.1 The rank of a cut on a causal-deontic formula 'Y is the ordered pair (hi + 1, x) 
where x ranges over the set of letters {a, c, d} and -< denotes the standard ascending order on 
the letters of the alphabet. 
Definition 3.2.2 The level of a cut is the sum of the heights of the derivations of the premises 
where the height of a derivation is the maximum length of the branches in the proofiree and the 
length of a branch is the number of nodes in the branch minus 1. 
Lemma 3.2.3 If 7rl and 7r2 in 
7r2 
'Y', f2 ~x 'Y 
-------------------cut 
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are cut-free derivations of rl ~x 'Y' and I', r2 ~x I, respectively, then there exists a cut-free 
derivation of r}, r 2 ~x I' 
Proof The proof is by induction on the ordered pair (r, I) where r and I are the rank of the cut 
on I and the level of the cut, respectively. The basic idea is to replace a cut with simpler cuts, i.e 
with cuts that have either a smaller rank than, or the same rank but a lower level than, the original 
one. However, in the presence of the structural rule of contraction this is not always possible 
since the cut in 
71'2 
I I r 
I ," 2 ~x I 
I con 
I, r 2 ~x I 
---------- cut 
should be replaced by two cuts 
but the level of the cut labelled with t is not necessarily lower than the level of the original cut. 
The simplest solution to this problem is to use multicuts as in Gentzen's original proof [Gen35]. 
The multicut rule 
I I r I , ... ,,, 2 ~x I 
--------------cut 
allows several copies of the cut formula I' in the right premise of the rule. It is straightforward 
to show that the multicut rule is admissible in the system and hence it can be used instead of a 
simple cut whenever necessary. Now, there are the following three cases to consider. 
1. Either the left or the right premise of a cut is an axiom. In the latter case we have that 
71' 
----ax 
fj ~a T}p T}p ~a T}p 
--------------cut 
fj~a T}p 
reduces to the cut-free derivation 
71' 
fj~a T}p 
The former case is similar and therefore omitted. These two cases form the base case of 
the induction. 
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2. If the cut formula is not principal in at least one of the premises ofa cut then we permute 
the order of the rules in the derivation. We consider only one case in detail, all other cases 
being similar and therefore omitted. If the right premise of the cut is the conclusion of an 






I, fl *x 11 
--------- cut 
f, fl :::?x 11 f2 :::?x 12 
-------------- R 0 
f,rl,f2:::?x ,1 0 , 2 
rl *x 11 I,r2:::?x 12 
----------Ro 
rl",r2:::?x ,1 0 , 2 
-----------------cut 
7r2 
" r2 :::?x 12 ------------cut 
fl :::?x 11 f, f2 *x 12 
------------R 0 
rl,r,r2:::?x ,1 0 , 2 
Since in both cases the new cut has the same rank but a lower level than the original one 
we can apply the induction hypothesis. 
3. If the cut formula is principal in both the premises of a cut then we replace the cut with 
a simpler one, i.e. with a cut of smaller rank. We consider only the cases involving the 
(a/c), (c/d), and (-t rules, all other cases being similar and therefore omitted. 
(a) If both premises of the cut are the conclusion ofinstances of (a/c) then 
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reduces to 
7rl 
- I "II =?a "I "I', fh =?a "I 
-------------------cut 
Since the new cut has a smaller rank than the original one (a -< c) we can apply the 
induction hypothesis. 
(b) If both premises of the cut are the conclusion of instances of ( c / d) then 
7rl 7r2 
:1 =?c ~: (c/d) 
'::'1 =?d ~ 
~:':2 =?c ~ (c/d) 




~/, 22 :::}c ~ 
------------------cut 
Since the new cut has a smaller rank than the original one (c -< d) we can apply the 
induction hypothesis. 
(c) If the left premise of the cut is the conclusion of an instance of (c/d) and the right 
premise is the conclusion of an instance of ( - t then 
7r2 
- cl '=' =? "I, .. ,~2 cTJ (-t 
(i]t,e',S2 =?d "10 
--------------------------- cut 
reduces to 
Since the new cut has a smaller rank than the original one (c -< d) we can apply the 
induction hypothesis. 
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(d) Ifboth premises of the cut are the conclusion of an instances of ( - t then 
reduces to 
Since the new cut has a smaller rank than the original one (1171 < 117°1) we can apply 
the induction hypothesis. o 
3.3 Discussion and final remarks 
We have presented a sequent calculus system for the basic causal-deontic fragment of the prag-
matic language and shown that it satisfies the cut elimination property. Proof theory will also 
playa major role in chapter 5. However, in contrast to this chapter, there we have to deal with 
a natural deduction system. Let us only mention at this point that the natural deduction presen-
tation of the basic causal-deontic rules given in figure 5.1 and the sequent calculus presentation 
given in this chapter are equivalent up to provability. 
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Chapter 4 
On a provability semantics 
In general we are interested in a semantics that does not rely on the reflection principle discussed 
in chapter 2, i.e. on a translation of the logic for pragmatics into bimodal logic. We shall now 
investigate a class of sound and complete Kripke models for the basic causal-deontic fragment 
that, unlike the ones considered in [BR03], do not rely on such a translation; rather they can be 
seen as a refinement of the Kripke models for the multiplicative fragment of the logic of bunched 
implications given in [POY04]. As we shall see in chapter 6, Kripke models give rise to algebraic 
models, a class of categorical models that deal only with provability. 
4.1 Basic Kripke frame and model 
Following the standard way of introducing Kripke semantics we first provide the concept of 
Kripke frame (see definition 4.1.3) and then endow it with a forcing relation in order to get a 
Kripke model (see definition 4.1.4). Note that the Kripke semantics is defined in such a way that 
the so-called monotonicity property is satisfied (see lemma 4.1.6). 
Definition 4.1.1 A preordered monoid (M,·, 1,~) is a commutative monoid (M,·, 1) endowed 
with a pre order ~ such that, for all ml,m~,m2,m2 E M, ifml ~ m~ and m2 ~ m2 then 
Definition 4.1.2 A pre ordered monoid (M,', 1,~) is called relevant if, for all m E M, m ~ 
m . m. For the sake of conciseness we shall use relevant monoid instead of relevant preordered 
monoid throughout this thesis. 
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Definition 4.1.3 Let U = (U,', 1, j) and W = (W,·, 1, j) be relevant monoids such that U is 
a relevant submonoid of W. A basic Kripke frame is a triple (W, U, <l) where <J ~ U X W is a 
binary relation such that 
1. for all u E U and W E W, if U <J wand W j 1 then U ~ 1; 
2. for all u E U and w, w', w" E W, if U <l wand w j w' . w" then there exist u', u" E U 
such that u' <l w', U" <l w", and u j u' . u"; 
3. for all u' E U and w, w', w" E W, if u' <l w' and w j w' . w" then, for all u E U, if u <l w 
then u j u' . w". 
Definition 4.1.4 A basic Kripke model (W, U, <l, If-) is a basic Kripke frame (W, U, <J) endowed 
with a forcing relation If- ~ W x r. Given a downward closed subset l TJ; of U for each proposi-
tional atom p, the forcing relation is defined as follows: 
2. w If- eiffw j 1; 
3. w If- TJo iff for all u E U such that u <l W, u If- TJ; 
4. w If- TJ £) ~ iff for all w' E W such that w' If- TJ, w . w' If- ~; 
5. w If- 11012 iff there exist WI, W2 E W such that w j WI . W2, WI If- 11, and W2 If- 12. 
Remark 4.1.5 We provide now rationales for the use of U and <l, and for condition (1), (2), 
and (3) in definition 4.1.3. First, the subset U ofW contains all possible worlds that force some 
assertive formula TJ and thus <l serves the purpose to reduce the forcing of a normative formula 
TJo to the forcing of the underlying assertive formula TJ. Second, condition (1) of definition 
4.1.3 makes sure that each w E W that forces f also forces eO. Similarly, condition (2) makes 
sure that each w E W that forces TJ~ 0 TJ2 also forces (TJ1 0 TJ2)o. Hence, both conditions taken 
together guarantee that the (-t operator preserves the relevant structure. Third, condition (3) 
of definition 4.1.3 will playa crucial role in the proof of soundness given below. It provides the 
semantic counterpart of the (-t rule. It is worth mentioning that condition (1) together with 
condition (3) have the side effect that each w E W that forces TJ also forces TJo, thus reflecting 
the fact that TJ =>d rJ° is derivable in sequent calculus. 
I Downward closure means that, for all u, u' E U, if u' E "'; and u ::::; u' then u E ",;. 
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Lemma 4.1.6 For all w, w' E W, if w' If- "{ and w ~ w' then w II- "{. 
Proof By induction on the complexity of "{. We consider only the case where "{ = ",0. Given 
u' E U such that u' <l w', by condition (3) of definition 4.1.3 we have that, for all u E U, if u <l w 
then u ~ u'. By condition (3) of definition 4.1.4 and the induction hypothesis we have that u If- '" 
and thus, by condition (3) of definition 4.1.4 again, that w II- ",0. o 
4.2 Soundness and completeness 
We show now that the class of Kripke models given above is sound and complete (see theorems 
4.2.3 and 4.2.4) with respect to the sequent calculus system provided in the previous chapter. 
Remark 4.2.1 Given r = "{I, .•. , "{n we use w If- r as a shorthand notation forw II- "{I Q •• 'O"{n' 
Definition 4.2.2 A sequent r =?x "{ is valid if, for all basic Kripke models (W, U, <l, If-) and for 
all wE W such that w If- r, we have that w If- 'Y. 
Theorem 4.2.3 (soundness) If a sequent r =?x "{ is derivable according to the rules of figure 
3.1 then it is valid. 
Proof This is shown by induction on the height of the derivation of r =?x 'Y. The two most 
interesting cases are the ones in which the derivation ends with either an instance of con or an 
instance of ( - t. In these cases we proceed as follows: 
1. If the derivation ends with an instance of 
"{',,,{',r =?x "{ 
-----con 
. "{', r =?x "{ 
then we have to show that if w If- "{', r then w If- "{. By condition (5) of definition 4.1.4 
there exist w', w" E W such that w ~ w' . w", w' II- i, and w" II- r. By definition 4.1.3 
we have that (W,', 1,~) is relevant and thus that w' ~ w' . w'. Hence, by condition (5) 
of definition 4.1.4 we have that w' II- 'Y' Q i. That w II- "{ follows then from the induction 
hypothesis. 
2. If the derivation ends with an instance of 
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then we have to show that if w II- (fit, S then w II- 1]0. By condition (5) of definition 4.1.4 
there exist w',w" E W such that w ~ w' . w", w' II- (fit, and w" II- S. Given u' E U 
such that u' <1 w', by applying first condition (5) of definition 4.1.4, then condition (2) of 
definition 4.1.3, then condition (3) of definition 4.1.4, and then condition (5) of definition 
4.1.4 again, we get that u' II- fi. Thus, by the induction hypothesis we have that u' ·w" II- 1]. 
That w II- 1]0 follows then by applying lemma 4.1.6 and condition (3) of definition 4.1.4 to 
the fact that, by condition (3) of definition 4.1.3, we have that, for all u E U, if u <1 w then 
u ~ u'· w". o 
Theorem 4.2.4 (completeness) If a sequent r =}x / is valid then it is derivable according to 
the rules of figure 3.1. 
Proof This is shown by constructing a so-called syntactic model. If lSI and If! denote the set 
of all pure causal and causal-deontic formulae, respectively, then clearly (lSI, 0, €) and (Irl, 0, €) 
can be regarded as commutative monoids and the former is a proper submonoid of the latter. If 
the relation :; ~ ifl x Irj (resp. lSI x lSi) is defined as 
{(f1, /2) 1/1 =}x /2 is derivable without cuts} 
(resp. {(6, 6) 16 =}x 6 is derivable without cuts}) 
then lSI = (lSI, 0, €,:o and Irl = (Irl, 0, €,:;) are both relevant monoids and the former is a 
proper relevant submonoid of the latter. Given k, 1 ~ 1, the relation <1 ~ lSI x Irl is obtained by 
taking the set of all ordered pairs of the form2 (1](k), 1]0) and (e(l), e) and closing it with respect 
to products, i.e. if 6 <1/1 and 6 <1/2, then 6 06 <1/1 0/2. Thus, we have a Kripke frame 
(Irl, lSI, <1). To obtain a Kripke model it suffices to provide the definition of the forcing relation 
II- ~ Irl x Irj: it is the set of all ordered pairs (fl, '1'2) such that '1'1 =}x '1'2 is derivable without 
cuts. If "'; denotes the set of all causal formulae e such that e =}x "'p is derivable without cuts 
then it is straightforward to check that II- satisfies all the required conditions. For illustrative 
purposes let us spell out the proof of condition (3) of definition 4.1.4 in detail. 
1. On the one hand, we have to show that if w II- 1]0 then, for all u E U such that u <1 W, 
u II- ",. Assume that w II- 1]0, i.e. that w = '1' and that there exists a cut-free derivation of 
/ =}d 1]0. By inspection of the rules we have that every cut-free derivation of'1' =}d ",0 
contains exactly one instance of the (-t rule. So, if / = 1]1 0 ••• 0 "'~ 0 6 0 ... 0 em 
2We use 'Y(n) as shorthand notation for 'Y 0 ••• 0 'Y, the relevant conjunction of n times 'Y. 
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then every u such that U <l W is of the form u = 1]~kt} 0 •.• 0 1]~kn) 0 ~~lt} 0 ••• 0 ~~m) 
where ki' lj 2: 1. Now, if we assume furthermore that u If 1] then there exists no cut-free 
derivation of 1]ikl) , ... ,1]~kn), ~ill), ••• ,~~m) =?c 1]. But the premise of the instance of 
( -t has to be the conclusion of such a derivation, thus contradicting the last assumption. 
Therefore, it follows that u 11-1]. 
2. On the other hand, we have to show that if, for all u E U such that u <l W, u II- 1] then 
W II- 1]0. Given u such that U <l W implies u II- 1], i.e. given u such that u = ~ and u <l W 
for some w = ( imply that there exists a cut-free derivation of e =>c 1], we may assume 
that the derivation of ~ =?c 1] ends with ij,:::: =?c 1] followed by instances of Co and con. 
Within this context, the (_)0 rule yields (ij)O,:::: =>d 1]0 from which { =>d 1]0 follows by 
instances of C 0 and con. In other words, we have shown that, for all u such that u = e 
and u <l w for some w = {, w If- 1]0. o 
4.3 Discussion and final remarks 
We have presented a sound and complete Kripke semantics for the basic causal-deontic fragment 
of the pragmatic language. We have not investigated whether and how the Kripke semantics 




As a first step towards the development of a semantics of proofs we consider the basic causal-
deontic system from a type-theoretical perspective, i.e. we introduce a presentation of the causal-
deontic fragment of the pragmatic language that is based on terms and equations in context and 
discuss some of the issues related to this way of looking at the system. The advantage of having 
a type theory is that it provides us with the right level of generality for the investigation of a 
categorical semantics in the next chapter, i.e. terms in context can be regarded as morphisms and 
equations in context as equalities of morphisms. It is worth pointing out that the term formation 
rules are based on a natural deduction system that is derived from the sequent calculus presenta-
tion of the logic given in chapter 3. As an immediate consequence, the equations in context can 
be motivated by certain proof transformations given in chapter 3. 
5.1 Terms and equations in context 
Roughly speaking, the essence ofthe Curry-Howard correspondence consists of the insight that 
there is a tight connection between logical systems and specific extensions of the well known 
'x-calculus. In a type-theoretical setting this means that formulae, which in this context are also 
called types, can be annotated by terms that provide means to encode derivations as expressions 
of some term calculus. The aim of this section is to provide such a calculus (see definition 5.1.1) 
and to show how a natural deduction system for the types of the basic causal-deontic fragment 
of the pragmatic language can be annotated by its terms (see figure 5.1). However, this is only 
one aspect of the story. The other important issue is that one needs to consider also certain 
5.1. Terms and equations in context 45 
equations between expressions of the tenn calculus: we simply provide a collection of {3- and 
77-equations (see figures 5.2 and 5.3), postponing their proof-theoretical justification to the next 
section. Finally, we note that one can dispense with equations induced by commuting conversions 
and that the tenn calculus is non-trivial (see remarks 5.1.7 and 5.1.10). 
Definition 5.1.1 The tenn calculus for the basic causal deontic system is defined as follows: 
M, N := U I * I Au.M I (M)N I M·N Ilet N be * in M Ilet N be ul 'U2 in M 
I {a ~ c} [11/l:! I M]I {c ~ d} [tVy I M]I prm_ob [1:1/y I M] 
Remark 5.1.2 It is worth mentioning that the calculus can naturally be divided in two parts: 
whereas the tenns of the first row of the previous definition correspond to the standard tenns of 
the multiplicative fragment of intuitionistic linear logic (see for instance [MMdPR05]), the terms 
of the second row need some explanation. First, note that 1:1 and :l! are shorthand notation for 
Ml, ... ,Mn and Ul, ... ,Un' Then, let us consider the term fonnation rules or tenns in contexts 
provided in figure 5.1 where contexts r, i.e. items on the lefthand side of C>x in r c>x M:" are 
collections Ul: ,1, ... ,Un: ,n of typed variables with Ui 1= Uj whenever i 1= j. The tenn for-
mation rules for {a 1-+ C } [1:1/:l! I Mj, {c ~ d} [M/l:! I Mj, and prm_ob [1:1/Y I M] are basically inspired 
by the tenn fonnation rule provided in [BdPROI] for a basic constructive modality; the square 
bracket notation is used to make explicit which assumptions are closed for substitution. Note that 
prm_ob stands for promote obligation and that its tenn fonnation rule is more complex than the 
one for the other two tenns since it has to carry along parameters. Finally, it is worth pointing 
out that there is no special syntax for contractions in the tenn calculus. These are dealt with by 
allowing for sharing contexts in term fonnation rules with more than one premise. Indeed, we 
have that r" stands for {u:, I (u: ,) E 1"/ and i E {I, ... ,m + n}} in the (-t rule; analogous 
conventions apply for 3' and r' in the (a/ c) and (c / d) rules. 
Remark 5.1.3 We have mentioned that the tenn fonnation rule for the tenn prlLob [1:1/Y I M] 
depends on parameters. It seems very natural to make this more explicit by splitting contexts such 
as r = r 1, r 2 in two parts r 1 I r 2 where the context r 1 contains all parameters. The paradigmatic 
case concerns essentially the (-t rule and requires to consider the following modified instance 
of it 
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£)I 
31,32 I>c Au.M: TJ D ~ 
r, r1 I>x N: € r, r2 I>x M: "I ----ax --€I 
I>x *: € ------------€e u: 'Y I>x u: 'Y r, r 1, r 2 I>x let N be * in M: 'Y 
Figure 5.1: Formation rules for terms 
where implicit contractions, i.e. sharing contexts, have been omitted for simplicity. Parameters 
occur on the lefthand side of the separator I and, in the case of the above rule, tell us which typed 
variables are not substituted by terms of type TJi. It is an easy exercise to reformulate the term 
formation rules in such a way that the parameters are made explicit in the context. 
Remark 5.1.4 We omit the formal definition of the substitution M[N/uJ of a term N for the free 
variable u in the term M and only point out that the free variables.!! in M become bound variables 
in {a 1-+ c} [M/.!! I Mj, {c 1-+ d }[!1/.!! I Mj, and prm_ob [!1/.!! I Mj. As an immediate consequence, 
substitution applies only to the terms in !1 but not to the term M. 
Lemma 5.1.5 The substitution rule 
r, r' I>x M': "I' r, r 1, u: "I', r2 t>x M: 'Y ---------------------------sub 
r,r1,r',r2I>x M[M'/uj:'Y 
is admissible in the system of figure 5.1. 
Proof By induction on the height of the derivation of the right premise. o 
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(>.u.M)N =c M[N/uJ 
let * be * in M =x M 
let Ml·M2 be Ul'U2 in M =x M[Ml/Ul,Mdu2J 
{a~ c}[th,({a~ c}[M/!!IM'J),tb/!!I,U'!!2IMJ =c 
{a ~ c} [!h, M, M2/!!I'!!' !!21 M[M'/ulJ 
{c ~ d}[MI, ({c ~ d}[M/!! I M'j),M2/!!1, u,g21 MJ =d 
{c ~ d}[MllM,th/!!1'}!'}!2/M[M'/u]j 
prnLob [MI, ({ C ~ d}[M/!! / M'j),M2/!!I, U'!!2/ MJ =d 
prnLob [MI, M, !:h/!!I' g, !!2/ M[M' lull 
pnLob [M2, (prm_ob [MI,M~/}!I'!!~ I M/j),M~/!!2' U,!!~ / MJ =d 
prm_ob [M2, MI, M~, M~/!!2'!!I'!!~ '!!2/ M[M'/ull 
Figure S.2: ;3-equations between terms 
Remark 5.1.6 We tum now to consider the equalities that hold between certain expressions of 
the term calculus, i.e. we provide a collection of so-called equations in context r c>x M = N: ,. 
In figures S.2 and S.3 we limit ourselves to provide equations of the form M =x N only, leaving 
it to the reader to supply the missing details (see also remarks S.2.5 and 5.2.6 below). The first 
three equations of each figure are the standard ;3- and 77-equalities of the mUltiplicative fragment 
of intuitionistic linear logic (see for instance [MMdPROS]). All other equations are similar to the 
ones provided by Kakutani in [Kak07] for an intuitionstic modal logic. 
Remark 5.1.7 Readers familiar with linear logic will have noticed that we have omitted equa-
tions induced by so-called commuting conversions. As pointed out in [MMdPROS] these equa-
tions can be expressed in terms of the ;3- and 77-equations for the relevant conjunction 0 and 
its unit E and thus we can dispense with them. To present the argument in a succinct form we 
introduce terms with a hole Cx[-J, sometimes also called contexts (the details are provided in 
definition S.1.8). As a consequence we have that all these equations can be regarded as instances 
of the general scheme 
Cx[let N be pin N'J =x let N be pin Cx[N/J (S.l) 
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Au.{M)u =e M 
let N be * in M[*/u] =x M[N/u] 
let N be UI 'U2 in M[UI 'U2/U] =x M[N/u] 
{a ~ c}[M/ulu] =e M 
{c ~ d}[M/ulu] =d M 
prm_ob [M/u 1 u] =d M 
Figure 5.3: '17-equations between tenns 
where: (a) Cx[M] denotes the tenn obtained by replacing the hole [-] in Cx[-] with the tenn M; 
(b) p stands either for VI 'V2 or *, depending on whether we deal with relevant conjunction or its 
unit. The calculations are provided in the proof oflemma 5.1.9. 
Definition 5.1.8 Tenns with a hole Cx [-) are defined by the following collection of grammars. 
Ca[-j := [-jl Ca[-j·M 1 M·Ca[-jllet Ca[-j be p in M Ilet M be p in Ca[-j 
Ce[-j := [-jl Ce[-j·M 1 M,Cc[-jllet Ce[-] be pin M Ilet M be pin Cc[-] 
1 AU.Ce [-]1 (Cc [-]) M 1 (M)(Cc [-]) 1 {a ~ c }[!1, Ce[-],!1' /g, u,g' 1 Mj 
I {a ~ c }ttl/g 1 Ce[-]] 
Cd[-j := [-jl Cd[-j'M 1 M·Cd[-j Ilet Cd[-j be p in M Ilet M be pin Cd[-] 
I {c ~ d} [11, Cd[-j,!1' /g, u,!!, 1 Mj 1 prm_ob ttl, Cd[-],!1' /g, u, g' 1 M] 
1 {c ~ d}[!1/gl Cd[-lll prm_ob [Mig 1 Cd[-J] 
Lemma 5.1.9 Instances of(5.1) are induced by the equations provided in figures 5.2 and 5.3. 
Proof We only treat the case where p = VI'V2, the other one being analogous. 
let N be vI,v2 in Cx[N'j =x let N be vI'v2 in Cx[N'[Vl/VI, V2/V2]J (8) 
=x let N be vI ,v2 in Cx[let vI ,v2 be vI ,v2 in N'j ({3) 
=x let N be vI ,v2 in (Cx[let v be vI'V2 in N'][VI·v2/V]) (s) 
=x Cx[let v be VI ,v2 in N'] [N/v] ('T}) 
=x Cx[let N be vI,v2 in N'] (s) 
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*+ = () 
(>.u.M)t = Au.Mt 
((Mr)M2)+ = (Mf)M~ 
(MI·M2)t = (Mi, M~) 
(let N be * in M)t = Mt 
(let N be UI'U2 in M)t = Mt[fst Nt lUI, snd Nt IU2] 
({a t-+ e}[!:!/g I MDt = Ak.(Mt)(Ag.(k)Mt) 
({ e t-+ d}[M/g I M])+ = Ak.(Mt)(Ag.(k)M+) 
(prm_ob [M,M' Ig,g' I MDt = Ak.(Mt)(Ag.((M')t)(Ag'.(k)Mt)) 
Figure 5.4: Translation into A-calculus 
For instance, given the case that Cd [-] is shorthand for prm_ob [M, [-J, M'/g, u, g' I Mj, we get that 
let N be VI' v2 in (prm_o b [M, N', M'/g, u, g' 1M]) 
=d let N be VI ,v2 in (prm_ob [tl, N'[vdvI, v2/v2]' M'/g, u, g' I M]) 
=d let N be VI ,v2 in (prm_ob [!:!, (let VI 'V2 be VI ,v2 in N'), M'/g, u, g' I MJ) 
=d let N be vl,v2 in ((prm_ob [!:!, (let V be vI,v2 in N'),M' Ig, u,g' I M])[VI'V2/v]) 
=d (prm_ob [!:!, (let V be VI'V2 in N'),M'/g, u,g' I M])[N/v] 
=d prm_ob [!:!, (let N be VI ,v2 in N'), M'/g, u, g'l M] 
o 
Remark 5.1.10 We conclude this section with an equality-preserving translation into simple 
typed A-calculus with pairing. This serves the purpose to show that the term assignment is non-
trivial, i.e. that not all terms are equal. We simply adapt the translation given in [Bie94] and 
combine it with the one provided by Kakutani in [Kak07]: the translation of terms is given in 
figure 5.4. The translation of types or formulae needs to take care also of the deductive context, 
generally indicated by the entailment relation t>x of our calculus. Given that (17)~ = ((17)! :J 
17p) :J 17p, (~)l = ((~)~ ~ 17p) ~ 17p, and (1]0)1 = ((1])~ :) 1]p) ~ 1]p where 1]p is an arbitrary 
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assertive elementary formula, it is straightforward to show that ifrl>xM:, then (r)i I> Mt: (,)i is 
derivable in simple typed A-calculus with pairing, i.e. that the translation preserves typing. That 
the translation also preserves equalities is shown by the following result. 
Lemma 5.1.11 Ifr I>x M = N:, then (r)~ I> Mt = Nt: (f)t 
Proof We only provide the following calculation regarding ,B-equality: 
(prm_ob l!12' (prm_ob l!11,!:!~/!!I'!!~ I M']),!:!~/!!2' U,l!~ I M])t 
=def Ak.(!:!~)(A!!2'( (prm_ob [!:!I' !:!~/!!I'!!~ I M'])t)(AU.( (!:!~)t) (A!!~.(k )Mt))) 
=def Ak.(l:1~)(A!!2·(Ah.(Mf) (A!h·( (l:1~ )t) (A!!~.( h) (M')t))) (AU.( (M~)+) (A!!;.(k )Mt))) 
=(3 Ak.(M~) (A!!2' (M!) (A!!I' ((MDt) (A!!i .( (AU.( (M~)t) (A!!; .(k )M+))) (M')+))) 
=(3 Ak.(M~) (A!!2·(MI)(A!!I·( (MDt) (A!!~.( (M~)+) (A!!~.(k) (Mt[(M')t Iu]))))) 
=def (prm_ob l!12,Ml,Mi,M~/!!2'!!I,!!L!!~ I M[M'/u]])t 
5.2 Proof-theoretical considerations 
o 
The aim of this section is to provide a proof-theoretical justification of the type theory presented 
in the previous section. First of all, we need to address the issue of switching from the sequent 
calculus presentation of the logic given in chapter 3 to a natural deduction system: we show that 
whatever can be derived in one system can also be derived in the other system (see proposition 
5.2.4), thus proving that the two presentations of the logic are equivalent. Next, we show that the 
equations given in figures 5.2 and 5.3 are induced by so-called ,B-reductions and 1]-expansions 
(see remarks 5.2.5 and 5.2.6). Finally, we also provide a proof-theoretical justification of scheme 
(5.1) considered in remark 5.1.7 (see remark 5.2.8). 
Remark 5.2.1 Since the emphasis of this section is to provide a motivation for the type theory 
we limit ourselves to give only some hints with respect to the issues of normalization and conflu-
ence. A proof of strong normalization for ,B- and 1]-reductions can be obtained in a straightfor-
ward fashion by means of the translation provided in figure 5.4. Given that strong normalization 
holds, confluence follows from weak confluence via Newman's lemma (see for instance [TSOO]): 
a proof of weak confluence for a system very similar to ours is given in [Kak07]. 
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Remark 5.2.2 The natural deduction rules for the causal-deontic system are implicitly given in 
the term formation rules of figure 5.1 and can be obtained by keeping the types while erasing 
the variables and terms on the lefthand side and the righthand side of C>x. To make this more 
explicit we shall change notation and write 11, ... , In .... x I instead OfUI: 11, ... , Un: In C>x M: I 
whenever we do not care about variables and terms. 
Remark 5.2.3 The only non-standard rules of figure 5.1 are the (a/c), (c / d), and ( - t rules 
and they can all be motivated in a similar fashion. These rules are inspired by the natural deduc-
tion rule for the constructive modal logic IK given in [BdPR01] (see also [BeISS]) and have the 
advantage that the system is closed under substitution (see lemma 5.1.5). Indeed, consider the 
(-t rule 
{ri, r~' .... d TJihEN {r~, r~~n .... d ~diEM TJI, .. ·, TJn,6,· .. , ~m .... c TJ 
rI, ... ,rn,r~, ... ,r~,r" .... d TJo 
written in tree form: 
TJl ... 7]~ 6 .. · ~m TJ 
The [-] notation in the scheme indicates that all premises of the derivation ending with TJ must 
be closed for substitution, thus making it necessary to add the new premises TJl' ... , 7]~ and 
6, ... ,~m to the rule. In this way one can make sure that substitutions cannot inappropriately 
interfere with the different levels of the system. Note that the rule acts both as an introduction 
as well as an elimination rule: on the one hand it introduces TJo; on the other hand it eliminates 
TJl' ... , TJ~ and 6, ... , ~m. The elimination of the pure causal formulae 6, ... , ~n is justified by 
the fact that there is an implicit change of entailment relation. 
Proposition 5.2.4 (equivalence of systems) r .... x I if and only ifr =>x I' 
Proof This can be shown by providing a translation N( -) from sequent calculus derivations 
to natural deduction ones and a translation 9(-) from natural deduction derivations to sequent 
calculus ones. Here we consider only the cases for the (_)0 rule. 
1. A sequent calculus derivation 
7r 
TJI,··.,7]n,6"",~m=>cTJ 0 
o o~ ~ 0(-) TJI,· .. ,7]n, 1, .. ·, m=>dTJ 
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translates to 
2. A natural deduction derivation 
translates to 
TJ1,···,TJn,6,···,~m~cTJ 0 
o 0 ceO (-) 
TJ1,···,TJn,<,.1,···,<,.m ~d TJ 
==========~======~~==~==~=====7.~==~===============cut r " r r" r r" r' r" r' 0 1, 1,···, n' n, l+n, 1,···, m+n' m ~d TJ 
======~~=========7=====7============con r",r1, ... ,rn,rl, ... ,r~ ~d TJo 
o 
Remark 5.2.5 The equations of figure 5.2 are induced by .8-reductions. These arise when a 
certain fonnula is first introduced and then immediately eliminated at the next step, thus giving 
rise to a so-called detour in the derivation. In the case of the (linear) conjunction 0 we have that 
the derivation 
11"2 
f2 '-x 12 ------------------oI 
f,/1,/2,r' '-x I 
-----------------------------------0£ 
f, fl' f 2,r' '-x I 
.8-reduces to 
Since the (a/c), (c/d), and (_)0 rules act both as an introduction as well as an elimination rule 
the concept of .8-reductions applies to them as well. An example of a .8-reduction involving two 
instances of the (-t rule is given in figure 5.5 where implicit contractions, i.e. sharing contexts, 
























r 2i I-d 772i jEM 
{ } { '} , 7r}i 7r Ii 7r 
ru I-d 77~i iEN ~i I-d ~li iEN' ih,31 I-c 77' (-t 
r ll .•. r 1n, r'n, ... , ~n' I-d (77"0 
{ , } 7r2i ~i I-d 6i iEM' 
r21o···, r2m, rH, ... rln,r'U'··· r'ln"~l'···' ~m' I-d 77° 
7r 
ih , 77' , 3 2 I-c 77 (_ t 
7r' 7r 
{ } { '} {'} 7rli 7rli 7r2i 
rli I-d 77~i iEN ~i I-d ~li iEN' ~i I-d 6i iEM' 
r2l, ... , r2m, rll, ... rln , r~l' ... r~n" ~l' ..• , ~m' I-d 77° 
ih,3l I-c 77' r72,77',32 I-c TJ 
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Remark 5.2.6 The equations of figure 5.3 are induced by 17-expansions. These arise when a 
certain formula is decomposed into simpler formulae. In the case of the (linear) conjunction 0 
we have that 
r .... x ,1 0,2 r 1,,1 0 "/2, r2 .... x, ---------------------------sub 
17-expands to 
,2 .... x ,2 rr' 
----------------oI 
rI,,1 0,2, r2 .... x, -----------------------------------sub r .... x ,1 0 ,2 
Note that we have build in a substitution into the 17-expansion, thus getting a generalised version 
of it. If 7r' consists only of an axiom then the 17-expansion for the (linear) conjunction 0 gets the 
more standard form: 
,2 .... x ,2 
r .... x ,1 0,2 17-expands to -------------- 0 I ,1,,2 .... x ,1 0,2 ---------------------------0£ r .... x'l 0,2 
In the case of the (-t rule we have that 
7]-expands to 
Analogously, we also have 7]-expansions for the (a/c) and (c / d) rules. 
Remark 5.2.7 It is worth mentioning that there is a tight connection between /3-equations and 
cut elimination: the interested reader may wish to verify that the left- and righthand sides of 
the last four equations of figure 5.2 correspond to the terms annotating the conclusions of the 
translations of the sequent calculus derivations given in the last case of the proof of theorem 
3.1.8. Similarly, the last three 7]-equations of figure 5.3 are linked to the translations of the 
sequent calculus derivations given in the proof of lemma 3.1.7. 
Remark 5.2.8 The equation in scheme (5.1) is induced by commuting conversions. Generally, 





















r, l-d T]i iEN 
r' l-d 11 0 12 r,/1,1'2,r" l-d (T]'t ---------------------------0£ 
r,r',r" I-d (rlt {r, ;dJ;EN' 7r T]1, ••. ,7]n,r/,6'···'~n' I-c 7] (-t 
rI, ... , r n, r, 1", r", 1"1" .. , 1"n' l-d 7]0 
converts to 
7f" { 7f~ } 7r 
r,/1./2,r"l-d (rlt ~I-d~i iEN' 7]1, ••• ,7]n,7]',6""'~n'l-c1} ° 
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in such an elimination rule the fonnula occurring in the succedent of its minor premise(s) is not 
related at all to the fonnula being eliminated: both the 0 e and the € e rules are examples of sum-
like elimination rules. A commuting conversion is then simply the pennutation of a sum-like 
elimination rule with another rule in the derivation. An example involving linear instances of the 
o e rule is: 
r ... x 11 0 /2 
converts to 
11"1 
r b Ib 12, r~ ... x I~ 0 I~ 
Another example, involving linear instances of the 0 e and (-t rules, is given in figure 5.6. Note 
that it induces the equation exemplified in the proof oflemma 5.1.9. 
5.3 Discussion and final remarks 
We have presented a type theory for the basic causal-deontic fragment of the logic for pragmatics 
and shown that its terms and equations in context are motivated by the rules and prooftransfor-
mations of the sequent calculus system given in chapter 3. It is worth mentioning that, since we 
have introduced the natural deduction system for the basic causal-deontic fragment rather as a 
tool than as a proper logical formalism on its own, we have only given some hints on how one 
can actually get strong nonnalization and confluence results. 
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Chapter 6 
On a semantics of proofs 
We come now to the main contribution of this thesis and introduce a categorical semantics for 
the basic causal-deontic fragment of the pragmatic language. Since, in such a semantics, distinct 
tenns or derivations get distinct denotations we have that categorical models provide a seman-
tics of proofs. In other words, non-degenerate categorical models identify only the morphisms 
that correspond to the terms occurring in the lefthand side and the righthand side of one of the 
equations in figures 5.2 or 5.3. Note that this is an immediate consequence of the soundness and 
completeness results provided in this chapter. Furthermore we also consider algebraic models, 
a degenerate instance of the categorical semantics, and use them to illustrate how the Kripke 
models introduced in chapter 4 fit into the general framework. 
6.1 Some preliminary definitions 
Before we can provide a fonnal definition of the categorical model for the basic causal-deontic 
system we need to set up notation. First of all, we introduce the concept of causal-deontic frame 
(see definition 6.1.8) which allows us to interpret all the rules except for the (-t rule. It exploits 
the well known relationship between the multiplicative fragment of linear logic and symmetric 
monoidal closed categories. The building blocks for its definition are given by the following 
concepts which provide means to take care of the structural rule of contraction, restricted forms 
of implication, and multiple entailment relations: relevant categories (see definition 6.1.2), re-
stricted closure (see definition 6.1.4), and relevant functors (see definition 6.1.7). The categorical 
structures needed for the interpretation of the (- t rule are the topic of the remainder of this 
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section (see remark 6.1.11): let us only point out here that the rule is interpreted as a morphism 
of indexed categories, i.e. a certain natural transformation. 
Definition 6.1.1 A symmetric monoidal category (M, ®, I, a, A, p, '7") consists of a category M 
together with a functor ®: M x M -- M, an object I of M, and four natural isomorphisms 
ax,Y,z:X®(Y®Z) -- (X®Y)®Z,AX:I®X ---+ X,px:X®I --X,7X,y:X®Y -- Y®X 
such that AI = PI: I ® I -- I and the following five diagrams commute for all objects X, Y, Z, 
and U ofM. 
Q Q 
X® (Y® (Z ®U)) --" (X®Y) ® (Z ® U) --" ((X®Y) ® Z) ®U 
id 0 a! 100 id 
X ® ((Y ® Z) ® U) " (X ® (Y ® Z» ® U 
X® (I®Y) X®Y X®I 
a!~ Tj" Tj~ 
(X ® I) ® Y 'd "X®Y Y®X -X®Y I®X A - X P®l T 
X® (Y®Z) 
Q 
" (X ® Y) ® Z 
T 
" Z ® (X ®Y) 
id0T! 10 
X® (Z ®Y) 
T 
" (X ® Z) ® Y 
T®id 
• (Z ® X) ®Y 
Definition 6.1.2 A relevant category (JR, ®, I, a, A, p, '7", 0) consists of a symmetric monoidal 
category (JR, ®, I, a, A, p, '7") together with a natural transformation 8x: X -- X ® X such that 
the following three diagrams commute for all objects X of JR. 
Remark 6.1.3 Relevant categories are also known as symmetric monoidal categories with di-
agonals (see for instance [Jac93] and [Jac94]), and they provide means to interpret the sequents 
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of the basic causal-deontic fragment. Indeed, the key idea is that a term in context f C>x M: {, i.e. 
a sequent of the form UI: {I,'''' Un:{n C>X M: {, is interpreted as a morphism [M]: [r] --+ b], 
i.e. a morphism [M]: bI] ® ... ® bn] --+ b], of some relevant category X. [M] is generally 
defined by induction and, in the case of the implication-free intuitionistic fragment of multi-
plicative linear logic, we have that [u] = idhJ' [*] = id[€B = idI, [M. N] = [M] ® [N], and 
[let N be pin M] = [N] ® id; [M] (see for instance [Bie94]). Remember that in the last case 
p stands for either VI ,v2 or *: in the former case we have that [N] ® id; [M] is a morphism 
[fI] ® [f2] --+ bd ® [t2] ® [r2] ---+ [t] of JR; in the latter case that it is a morphism 
[fI] ® [f2] ---+ [10] ® [r2] ~ [r2] -+ b] of R Diagonals provide means to get several 
instances of an object and thus allow one to model the implicit contractions that occur in the 
term formation rules offigure 5.1 with more than one premise: in these cases we precompose the 
interpretation with a morphism [r] ® [riD ® [f2] -+ ([r] ® [riD) ® ([r] ® [f2]) obtained 
by means of 8 and the other canonical morphisms. 
Definition 6.1.4 Given a relevant category JR = (JR, ®, I, a, A, p, T, 8), a relevant subcategory § 
ofJR, and a relevant subcategory 11' of§ we say that § is closed with respect to 11' if, for all objects 
T of 11', the functor (-) ® T: JR -+ JR has a right adjoint T -0 (-): § -+ § in JR, i.e. if for all 
objects R ofJR, S of§, and T of 11' we have that JR(R ® T, S) ~ JR(R, T -0 S). 
Remark 6.1.5 The standard definition of closure can be obtained as a special case of the above 
definition: one simply imposes that 11' = § = R For the purpose of this chapter it would suffice 
to assume that § = R However, when we deal with hypothetical norms in the next chapter we 
shall see an example where this is not the case. Still another way to express the above definition 
goes as follows (see for instance [Mac98]): for all objects S of§ and T of 11' there exists an object 
T -0 S of § together with a map app: (T -0 S) ® T --+ S of § such that for every object R 
of JR and every morphism f: R ® T -+ S of JR there exists a unique morphism cur(f): R -+ 
(T -0 S) of JR that satisfies cur(f) ® id; app = f. We can thus extend the above definition 
of [M] with the following two cases for (restricted) linear implication: [Au.M] = cur([M]) and 
[(M)N] = [M] ® [N]; app. The relevant counterpart of the latter case can again be obtained by 
precomposing with the canonical morphism [r] ® [riD ® [r2] -+ ([r] ® [riD) ® ([r] ® [r2]) 
(compare for instance with remark 6.1.3). 
Definition 6.1.6 A symmetric monoidal Junctor (F, m, n): MI -+ MI' between two symmetric 
monoidal categories M = (MI, ®, I, a, A, p, T) and MI' = (MI', ®', 1', a', >.', pi, T') consists of a 
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functor F: M --+ M' together with a natural transfonnation mx,Y::FX ®' FY ---+ F(X ® Y) 
and a morphism n: I' ---+ :FI such that, for all objects X, Y, and Z of M, the following four 
diagrams commute in M'. 
m®'id m 
(:FX ®' FY) ®' FZ • F(X ® Y) ®' FZ - F((X ® Y) ® Z) 
0,1 I F(a) 
:FX ®' (FY ®' FZ) ----. :FX ®' F(Y ® Z) - F(X ® (Y ® Z)) 
id®'m m 
m m 
:FI ®' :FX - F(I ® X) :FX ®' :FI - F(X ® I) 
m 
:FX ®' FY - F(X ® Y) 
n ,,' id ) j F(>.) id ", n ) j F(p) T' j jF(T) 
I' ®' :FX • :FX :FX ®' I' • FX >..' p' FY ®' :FX - F(Y ® X) m 
(F, m, n): M --+ M' is called strong if m is a natural isomorphism and n an isomorphism; it is 
called strict if both m and n are identities. 
Definition 6.1.7 A relevant functor (F, m, n): IR --+ IR' between two relevant categories IR = 
(IR,®,I,a,A,p,T,<5) and IR' = (IR',®',I',a',X,p',T',<5') is a symmetric monoidal functor 
(F, m, n): IR --+ IR' such that the following diagram commutes for all objects X ofR 
:FX ®' :FX --..... F(X ® X) 
m 
(T, m, n): IR --+ IR' is called strong if m is a natural isomorphism and n an isomorphism; it is 
called strict if both m and n are identities. 
Definition 6.1.8 A causal-deontic frame (A, e, lO, .Jac, .Jed, 0) consists of three relevant cate-
gories 
A = (A, ®,I, a, A,p, T, 8) e = (e, ®, I, a, A,p, T, 8) lO = (lJ)), ®, I, a, A, p, T, 8) 
together with three relevant functors 
such that both .Jac and .Jed are strict, and e is closed with respect to its subcategory .JacA. 
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Remark 6.1.9 It is worth mentioning that since the functor 0: A -+ D provides means to 
interpret the (_)0 operator it is crucial that it is not simply defined as Jac; Jed: A -+ D, the 
composition of the two functors .lac and Jed' Both .lac and Jed are required to be strict relevant 
functors whereas 0 does not need to satisfy this property. The assumption that both .lac and 
Jed are strict, i.e. that L2 and La are actually identities, is justified by the fact that we think of 
both of them as inclusion functors (compare also with remark 3.1.2). Note however that this is 
not a severe limitation: the more general case where both .lac and Jed are required to be strong 
relevant functors can be obtained in a straightforward fashion. 
Remark 6.1.10 From now on we shall make extended use of the following concept: a category 
without identities consists of a collection of objects and a collection of morphism such that the 
composition of morphisms is associative. In other words, we drop the requirement that there 
is an identity morphism satisfying the identity law from the usual definition of category. We 
follow [MBCB02] and call categories without identities semi-categories.! Arrows between semi-
categories or semi-functors are simply composition-preserving maps. Note that semi-categories 
and semi-functors form a category which we denote with SCat. 
Remark 6.1.11 The remainder of this section is devoted to the categorical structures needed 
for the interpretation of the modal rule. To get a rationale for its semantics let us consider the 
following instance 
"71, ~ =>c "72 
"71,e =>d "72 
of the (_)0 rule in sequent calculus notation. First of all, we shall assume that some specific 
causal-deontic frame (A, C, 1I}, .lac, Jed, 0) is given. Clearly, in the categorical model we need 
to interpret the premise of the rule as a morphism in the category C and the conclusion of the 
rule as a morphism in D. The definition of causal-deontic frame naturally suggests the following 
interpretations: 
[171, ~ =?c 172] = Jac[171] ® [~] -+ Jac[172] (in C) 
[171' e =?d 172] = 0[171] ® JCd[e] -+ 0[1]2] (in J[Jl) 
But how do we model the passage from the premise to the conclusion within this context? Let 
us observe that: (a) both interpretations have to live in the same environment, so that they can 
J Let us make two remarks about terminology: first, in [MB03] the term multiplicative graph is used 
instead of semi-category; second, the term semicategory is sometimes also used to denote a different 
concept (see, for instance [SHOO)) not relevant to the purpose of this thesis. 
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interact in some specific way; (b) the above instance of the (_)0 rule depends on the parame-
ter e (see also remark 5.1.3 for a natural deduction fonnulation of the (-t rule with explicit 
parameters). A natural way to take care of these aspects is given by split indexed categories: 
these are functors from a category BOP to Cat, the category of small categories (see for instance 
[Jac99]). Since [e] is an object ofC (and thus of COP) we are looking for suitable functors from 
cop to Cat that have the above interpretations among the morphisms of its image category. The 
obvious choice is to assign categories with morphisms of the form .Jae[1]I] 0 [e] ---+ .Jae[1]2] 
and 0[1]1] 0 .Jed[~] --+ 0[1]2] to an object [~] of cop but then we do not have identities in 
the image categories, i.e. the images of such functors are only semi-categories. Therefore, if we 
generalise the above situation and replace Cat by SCat, we can define functors cop --+ SCat 
(see definitions 6.1.12 and 6.1.13 below) that satisfy the required properties. It is worth pointing 
out that the morphisms in the image semi-category of the latter functor are actually of the form 
hI] 0 .Jed[~] --+ h2]' Nevertheless, within this framework the (_)0 rule can be modelled 
as a natural transformation between the two functors, i.e. as a morphism of generalised split in-
dexed categories that maps a morphism of the form .Jae [1]1] 0 [e] --+ .Jae [1]2] to the morphism 
0[1]1] 0 .Jed[~] ---+ 0[1]2] (see definition 6.1.16 below). 
Definition 6.1.12 The restriction functor n~: cop --+ SCat is defined as follows. It maps 
1. an object C ofC to the semi-category n~(C) that has 
(a) objects .JaeA ofC as objects, 
(b) morphisms .JaeAl 0 C --+ .JaeA2 ofC as morphisms; 
2. a morphism f: Cl --+ C2 ofC to the semi-functor 'R~(f):'R~(C2) --+ 'R~(Cr) which, 
in turn, maps 
(a) an object .JaeA Ofn~(C2) to the object .JacA Ofn~(Cl)' 
(b) a morphism g: .JaeAl 0 C2 --+ .JaeA2 of n~(C2) to the following morphism of 
n~(Cd· 
Definition 6.1.13 The expansionfunctor &2: cop --+ SCat is defined as follows. It maps 
1. an object C ofC to the semi-category &2(C) that has 
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(a) objects D ofD as objects, 
(b) morphisms D1 ® :redC --+ D2 ofD as morphisms; 
2. a morphism f: C1 --+ C2 ofC to the semi-functor £~(f): £~(C2) --+ £~(C1) which, in 
turn, maps 
(b) amorphism g: D1 ®:redC2 --+ D2 of £~(C2) to the following morphism of £~(C1)' 
Lemma 6.1.14 n~: cop --+ SCat and £~: cop --+ SCat are indeed functors. 
Proof Easy, since preservation of identities and compositions is inherited from C. 0 
Lemma 6.1.15 Given an object C ofC, n~(C) and £~(C) are indeed semi-categories. 
Proof We provide only the proof for 'R.~(C), the proof for £~(C) being analogous. Given 
morphisms 
ofn~(C), their composition is obtained by precomposing f' with the morphism 
of C. That composition is associative follows by a straightforward calculation. o 
Definition 6.1.16 A causal-deontic transformation 'I?: n~ -+ £~ is a natural transformation 
'l?c: n~(C) -+ £~(C) that maps 
1. an object :raeA of'R.~(C) to the object OA of £~(C), 
2. a morphism :raeAl ® C --+ :raeA2 ofn~(C) to the morphism OAl ® :redC -+ OA2 
of £~(C). 
Remark 6.1.17 It is worth mentioning that since, for any object C ofC, both 'R.~(C) and £~(C) 
are semi-categories 'l?c: 'R.~(C) -+ £2(C) is actually a semi-functor. At the level ofmorphisms 
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we have that the naturality square 
boils down to the commuting diagram 
t9 C1 (id ® f; g) 
OAI ® .7cdCl -------, OA2 
id " .1,,(£) j 
OAI ® .7edC2 -------. OA2 
t9Cl (g) 
6.2 Soundness and completeness 
We are now in the position to provide the definition of the categorical model (see definition 6.2.1 
and remark 6.2.3) and thus to establish a semantics of proofs for the basic causal-deontic system. 
We show that the categorical semantics is sound and complete (see theorems 6.2.5 and 6.2.6) 
with respect to the type theory provided in the previous chapter. 
Definition 6.2.1 A causal-de on tic category (A, e, D, .:lac, .7ed, 0, '!9) is a causal-deontic frame 
(A, e, lD, .7ae, .7ed, 0) endowed with a causaI-deontic transformation '!9: n~ --+ £2 such that, 
for all morphisms fl : .7aeAl ® Cl --+ .7aeA' and £2: .7aeA' ® C2 --+ JaeA2 ofe, the following 
coherence diagram commutes in D. 
Remark 6.2.2 Note that, whereas the naturality square of remark 6.1.17 provides means to deal 
with the substitution of parameters in the interpretation of the (-t rule, the above coherence 
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condition allows one to deal with the substitution of objects which are not parameters (see re-
mark 5.1.3 for a natural deduction formulation of the rule with explicit parameters and lemma 
6.2.4 below for a categorical reformulation of substitution). It is an open question whether this 
condition can be made implicit by assuming some suitable structure on the functors R~ and e~, 
and hence on the causal-deontic transformation iJ: R~ --+ e~. 
Remark 6.2.3 In order to complete the formal definition of the categorical model we need to 
explain how types and terms are interpreted in a causal-deontic category. Instead of going into 
the details we only give some hints. First, the interpretation function [-] maps assertive, pure 
causal, and causal-deontic formulae or types to objects of A, C, and JI}, respectively: 
2. pure causal types: [1]] = Jac[1]], [1] £) e] = Jac[1]] -<l [en, and [6 0 e2] = [6] ® [6]; 
Note that the interpretation [1]] of an assertive type 1] in C is obtained as the image along Jac 
of the interpretation of 1] in A; the interpretation [~D of a pure causal type e in JI} follows a 
similar pattern. Since the intended relevant category, be it either A, C, or JI}, will always be 
clear from the context this overloading of notation is harmless. Second, since we have already 
outlined in remark 6.1.3 and 6.1.5 how the multiplicative fragment of intuitionistic linear logic 
with contractions and a restricted form of implication can be interpreted by means of relevant 
categories with restricted closure, we limit ourself to spell out the interpretations of the terms for 
the (a/c), (c/d), and (_)0 rules offigure 5.1: these are given in figure 6.1 where, for simplicity, 
we have omitted the implicit contractions. 
Lemma 6.2.4 Given r [>x N: 'Y' and r l , u: ,', r 2 [>x M:" we have that [M[N/u]D is given by the 
morphism 
of X where, depending on the inference relation [>x, X is either one of the categories A, C, or JI}. 
Proof By induction on the structure of the term M (compare with lemma 5.1.5). o 
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[{ a 1-+ C }[Ml. ... , Mn/Ul, ... , Un I MJ] 
[31] ® ... ® [3n ] ------------.1ac[7]] 
iM,) " ... " IM,,! j =dd 1 :r.,[Mj 
.1ac[171] ® ... ® .1ac[7Jn] .1ac([171] 0 ... 0 [17n]) 
[{ C 1-+ d}[Ml' ... ,Mn/Ul,' .. ,Un I MJ] 
[rI] ® ... ® [r n] --=----------=--..... .1Cd[~] 
[M,)"···,, IM.I [ =d,[ 1.1~IMI 
.1cd[6] ® ... 0 .1cd[~n] .1cd([6] ® ... ® [';n]) 
[prm_ob [H, H' /g, g' I MJ] 
(0~1[ri]) ® (0:!1[rm ----------- 0[7]] 
[!!I" [!!'J [ =d,[ I ~lsllMI 
(0~1 O[17i]) ® (0~I.1cd[~i]) - 0(0f=I[17i]) ® .1cd(0~1[';i]) 
On ® id 
Figure 6.1: Terms and interpretations 
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Theorem 6.2.5 (soundness) Given any causal-deontic category (A, C,]D, .Jac, .Jcd, 0, fJ) to-
gether with an interpretation [-TI, if the equation in context r c>x M = M':7 is derivable then 
[M] = [M'] holds in X (= A, C, or ]D). 
Proof We need to show that all equations [M] = [M'] induced by the equations given in figures 
5.2 and 5.3 hold in the causal-deontic category. We consider only the case of the last equation 
of figure 5.2: details of the proof are summarised in figures 6.2 and 6.3. Note the fundamental 
role of the coherence condition provided in definition 6.2.1. One can adapt the proof to the case 
with implicit contractions by precomposing the left leg and the right leg of the upper square in 
the commuting diagram of figure 6.2 with an appropriate canonical morphism. o 
Theorem 6.2.6 (completeness) For any causal-deontic category (A, C,]D, .Jac, .Jcd, 0, fJ) and 
for any interpretation [-], if [M] = [M'] holds in X (= A, C, or ]D) for the terms in context 
r C>x M: 7 and r c>x M': 7 then the equation in context r c>x M = M': 7 is derivable. 
Proof This is a straightforward consequence of the following lemma: the key observation is 
that the interpretation function is simply given by the identity function. o 
Lemma 6.2.7 There exists (A,~, ]D, .Jac, .Jcd, 0,12.) such that every morphism f of:%: (= A, C, 
or lID is the interpretation ofa term in context r c>x M: 7. 
Proof The so-called syntactic category (or term model) is constructed as follows. Its objects 
are formulae 7 and its morphisms are equivalence classes of natural deduction derivations 7r of 
71 "'x 72· Each fragment ofthe natural deduction system induces one ofthe categories A, k and 
]D. The following instances 
'f/l "'c 'f/l 6 t-d ~1 6 "'c 6 
el t-d 6 
of (a/c) and (c/d) give rise to trivially relevant inclusion functors associated with A S.fv.ll 
C S.jull ]D. That C is closed with respect to A is an immediate consequence of the existence 
of the derived rules: 
e' ... c ( 7r 
-------oI 
'f/,~' t-c 'f/ 0 ~' 'f/ 0 {' "'c e 
---------------------sub 
'f/, {' t-c ~ 
-------DI e' t-c 'f/ D e 
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{rIi [>d Mli: 171'ihENl 
{r2i [>d M2( 172ihEN2 
Equation in context 
{r~i [>dM~i:6ihEMl 
{r~i [>d M~i: 6ihEM2 
U .r; u'·= [> M"TI' _l",I'_I'~1 C '" 
(I2 , II)' (n ,I2) [> d prm_o b [tb, (prm_o b [111 , 11~ h!r ,!!~ I M/]), 112 1!!2' U'!!2 I MJ 
= prm_ob [!b th, 11~, 112/!!1'!!2'!!~' !!21 M[M' lull: 170 
Commuting diagram 
a 
([[2] ® [[t]) ® ([[~] ® [[~]) » (([[2] ® [[t]) ® [[~]) ® [[~] 
(g, " g,) " ([!f.] ,,[!f.J) j j ((g,,, g,) " [!f.1) " Il!;] 
a 
(0[il2] ® O[ilt]) ® (..1<<1[3 t ] ® ..10<1[32]) - ((0[il2] ® O[ilt]) ® ..1cd[3 t ]) ® ..1cd[32] 
O,,,'d J I (O,"id)"id 
a 
(0([il2] ® [fft]) ® (..1<<1[3 t] ® ..1<d[32]) - (0([ff2] ® [ffl]) ® ..1<d[3tD) ® ..1<d[32] 
II 
0([1j2] ® [fflD) ® ..1<d([31] ® [32]) 
."".,E,I (I) j 
0[1]] ... -------- 0([1j2] ® [1]']) ® .1od[32] 
(the definitions of the morphisms gl, g2, i, and i' are provided in figure 6.3) 
Figure 6.2: An instance of soundness 1 
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Shorthand notations 
[rj1 ] ® '" ® [rjnj ] ---------" O[1]jl] ® ... ® O[1]jnj] 
[MjD = [Mjl] ® ... ® [Mjn;] 
Figure 6.3: An instance of soundness 2 
6.2. Soundness and completeness 70 
and 
The functor 0: A --+ j[J) maps a formula TJ to the formula TJo, and a derivation 71" OfTJ1 I-a TJ2 to 
the derivation 
TJ1 I-c TJ1 TJ1 I-a TJ2 (aj c) 
TJ1 I-c TJ2 (_ t 
TJ'll-d TJ2 
ofTJll-d TJ2' That it is relevant follows from the derivation ofTJl 0 TJ2 I-d (TJ1 0 r/2)O below and an 
analogous one for f I-d fO. 
TJ1 I-d TIl Tl2 I-d Tl2 
--------OI 
TJ~ I-d TJ2 TIl, Tl2 I-d TJl 0 Tl2 (_ t 
TJl, Tl2 I-d (TIl 0 Tl2t --------------------------------0£ 
Thus, we have obtained a causal-deontic frame. 1l maps a formula TI to the formula TJo, and a 
derivation 
TJ1, ~ I-c Tl2 -------------------0£ 
of TIl 0 e I-c Tl2 to the derivation 
TJ1l-dTJl el-d~ Tl1,~l-cTJ2(_t 
TJl' ~ I-d TJ2 -------------------0£ 
of TIl 0 ~ I-d Tl2' That the causal-deontic transformation 1l satisfies the required properties is a 
consequence of the reductions below: they show that the uppermost derivation belongs to the 
same equivalence class as the lowermost derivation. 
1. 1l is natural: 
71"' 
C' I-d C' C' I-.. .. TJ1 , .. c TJ2 (_ t 
TJl'~' I-d TJ~ ---------------------------------sub 





"11 , ~ c "12 (_ t 
,B-reduces to 
7r 
2. Coherence for ~: 
(1]')" t-d (r{)O 6 t-d 6 1]2,1]',6 t-c 1] 
-------------(-)" 
1/2, (1]')", ~2 t-d 1]0 
1]~ t-d 1]~ ~1 t-d 6 1/1, ~1 t-c 1]' ________ (_)0 




1/~ I-d 1/~ 6 t-d 6 111,6 t-c 11' (-t 
1/i, ~l I-d (1/,)0 
(1/2' 1/1), (~l' 6) t-d "10 
,B-reduces to 
o 
6.3 Algebraic models as instances 
We complete our investigation of a semantics of proofs with a class of sound and complete 
algebraic models (see definition 6.3.5 and proposition 6.3.7) for the basic causal-deontic system. 
To get straightforward proofs of soundness and completeness we follow the strategy adopted in 
[POY04], i.e. we introduce an intennediate calculus in figure 6.4 and show that it is equivalent 
to the sequent calculus system of chapter 3 (see lemma 6.3.3). Note that the algebraic models 
6°17l-c6 
{I I-c 17 S> 6 
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171 0 ~ I-c 172 
171 0 { I-d 172 
11 f-x 12 12 f-x 13 
11 f-x 13 
Figure 6.4: Lambek-style calculus 
are obtained by taking the posetal collapse of the above categorical semantics. The main reason 
for taking into account such a degenerate instance of the semantics of proof is that algebraic 
models provide means to illustrate how the Kripke semantics of chapter 4 fits into the general 
semantic framework. This is done by showing that Kripke models induce algebraic models (see 
proposition 6.3.8). Note however that our characterisation is not entirely algebraic: we take 
advantage of the forcing relation when defining the causal-deontic algebra. 
Remark 6.3.1 In [POY04], a calculus very similar to the one of figure 6.4 is called a Hilbert 
system. However, since the calculus should rather be seen as a deductive system in the sense 
of [LS86] than as a Hilbert system of axioms and rules, we call it Lambek-style calculus. Note 
that the calculus of figure 6.4 can be regarded as the set of production rules for the morphisms 
associated to a causal-dcontic category given in definition 6.2.1. 
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Lemma 6.3.2 Tll 0 ••• 0 Tl~ r-d (Tl1 0'" 0 Tlnt. 
Proof By the associativity of the relevant conjunction we may assume that the bracketing on 
the lefthand side and the righthand side Ofr-d is of the form ( ... ((a1 0 a2) 0 a2) 0"') 0 an. The 
proof proceeds then by induction on n. o 
Lemma 6.3.3 1'1 =>x 1'2 if and only if1'l r-x 1'2· 
Proof The difficult part is to show that 1'1 =>x 1'2 implies 1'1 r-x /2. We consider only the case 
where the sequent calculus derivation ends with an instance of the (_)0 rule. Note that this rule 
may be rendered as follows: 
Tl1 0 ••• 0 Tln 0 ~ =>c '" 
o 0 ~ o(-t 
"'I 0 ••• 0 Tln 0 => d Tl 
That the entailment Tll 0 ••• 0 Tl~ 0 ~ r-d 1}0 is derivable in the Lambek-style system is then shown 
as follows: 
(1) e r-d ~ 
(2) 1}1 0 ... 0 Tl~ r-d (1}1 0 ... 0 Tlnt 
(3) 1}1 0'" 0 1)~ 0 ~ r-d (1}1 0 .. • 0 1}nt 0 ~ (1) and (2) 
(4) "'I 0 .•• 0 1}n 0 ~ r-d 1) hypothesis 
(5) (1}1 0 ... 0 1}n)O 0 ~ r-d Tlo (4) 
(6) 1}1 0 ••• 0 Tl~ 0 ~ r-d 1}0 (3) and (5) 
0 
Definition 6.3.4 A causal-deontic algebra (A, C, D, i, j, 0) consists ofthree relevant monoids 
together with three monotone functions· 
i:A-C j:C-D o:A-D 
such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
1. i and j are monoid homomorphisms; 
2. Cis residuated (closed) with respect to i(A);2 
3. 0 is such that 1 ~d 0(1) and o(ar) . 0(a2) ~d 0(a1 . a2); 
2This means that there is a binary operation ~ such that, for all a E A and Cl, C2 E C, i(a) . Cl ~c C2 
ifana only ifcl :5c i(a) ~ C2. 
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Definition 6.3.5 An algebraic model (A, C, D, i, j, 0, [-]) consists of a causaI-deontic algebra 
(A, C, D, i, j, 0) together with an interpretation function [-] that maps assertive, pure causal, and 
causal-deontic formulae to elements of A, C, and D, respectively: 
1. assertive formulae: [7]p] = a E A, [€J = 1, and [7]1 07]2] = [7]1]' [7]2J; 
2. pure causal formulae: [7]] = i([7]]), [7] £) eJ = i([7]]) -<) [eJ, and [6 o6J = [6]' [6]; 
3. causal-deontic formulae: [7]0] = 0([7]]), [e] = j([e)), and b1 Ol'2J = [1'1] . b2J. 
Remark 6.3.6 Following the conventions of remark 6.2.3, the interpretation [7]J of an assertive 
formula 7] in C is obtained as the image along the function i of the interpretation of 7] in A; the 
interpretation [eJ of a pure causal formula e in D follows a similar pattern. 
Proposition 6.3.7 (soundness & completeness) I'll-x 1'2 if and only if b1J ~x b2J holds for 
all interpretations in all causal-deontic algebras. 
Proof We omit the straightforward proof. o 
Proposition 6.3.8 (relation between models) Given a basic Kripke model (W, U, <l, If-), we can 
construct an algebraic model (A, C, D, i,j, 0, [-]). 
Proof Let the elements of D be the downward closed subsets of W. Given downward closed 
subsets WI and W2 ofW, if we let WI' W2 = {W E WI W j WI' W2 for WI E WI, W2 E W2} 
and 1 = {w E WI W j I} then D = (D,., 1,~) is a relevant monoid where ~ stands for 
subset inclusion. If A is the smallest set of downward closed subsets X of D such that, for all 
x E X, x If- 7] for any assertive formula 7] and C the smallest set of downward closed subsets 
Y of D such that, for all y E Y, Y If- e for any pure causal formula e, then A = (A", 1,~) 
and C = (C,·, 1,~) are relevant monoids. In this setting i and j are given by identities; that 
C is closed with respect to A = i(A) follows immediately from the definition of forcing. The 
function 0: A ----. D associates to a downward closed subset X of A the downward closed 
subset {w E W I U <l W for U E X} of D; that it satisfies the required properties follows from 
the definition of Kripke model. Thus we have a causal-deontic algebra (A, C, D, i,j, 0). The 
algebraic model is then obtained by setting b] = {w E WI w If- "(}. 0 
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6.4 Discussion and final remarks 
We thus conclude our investigation ofthe proof theory and semantics of the basic causal-deontic 
system. In summary, we have considered sequent calculus and natural deduction presentations 
for it, presented a term assignment for natural deduction, and provided classes of sound and com-
plete Kripke, algebraic, and categorical models. Nonetheless, there are some issue that should 
be addressed in future work. First, there is room for improvement with respect to the relation 
between Kripke and algebraic models. On the one hand, we have already pointed out at the be-
ginning of the previous section that the construction of the causal-deontic algebra in the proof 
of proposition 6.3.8 is not entirely algebraic. On the other hand, it would be interesting to in-
vestigate whether Kripke models are induced by algebraic models, thus providing means to get 
some sort of representation result. Second, we conjecture that the type theory proposed in the 
previous chapter provides the internal language (see for instance [MMdPR05] and [Mai08]) for 
causal-deontic categories. Third, as we have argued in [Ran08b], there are natural deduction 
presentations of the basic intuitionistic modal logic K that bear a close relationship to fibrations 
and hence to split indexed categories. It thus seems that the above categorical construction can 
be considered as a particular instance of some general scheme. 
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Chapter 7 
Extended deontic system 
We consider now the logical system corresponding to the extended causal-deontic fragment Lk 
provided in definition 2.3.1. Remember that it simply corresponds to the basic causal-deontic 
fragment L~ of the pragmatic language with normative formulae r/ defined by the grammar 
1]; 11]°11 1] 11]° 0 1]0 where p is an element of Q, the set of atomic propositions that satisfy the 
content condition. We shall discuss only how certain definitions have to be rearranged for the new 
system. We conjecture however that, by adapting the proofs provided in the previous chapters, 
one can actually get the expected soundness and completeness results. 
7.1 New rules and Kripke models 
The extended causal-deontic system is obtained by adding the rules of figure 7.1 to the basic 
causal-deontic rules of figure 3.1 without the (-t rule. The main aim of this section is to show 
how the Kripke models of chapter 4 can be adapted to the extended system. 
Remark 7.1.1 The new version of the (_)0 rule is based on the restriction that fj f e. This 
condition serves the purpose to guarantee that Hume's law cannot be violated. Note that by the 
definition of the grammar for 1]0 we also have that rad(fj, 1]) ~ Q. As a consequence of the dis 
axiom, we have that both 1]r 0 T]2 and (T]l 0 1]2t are interderivable. 
Remark 7.1.2 Both the left and the right rule for II emphasise that the connective can be con-
sidered as a proper conditional implication. As in remark 3.1.4 we have that the extended deontic 
system is closely related to Hom fragments of multiplicative linear logic. 
--------dis 
('171 0 '172)0 '*d "II 0 "12 
7.1. New rules and Kripke models 77 
Figure 7.1: Extended deontic rules 
Definition 7.1.3 A preordered semigroup (S,·, $) is a commutative semigroup (S,·, 1) en-
dowed with a preorder $ such that, for all 81,81,82,82 E S, if 81 $ 81 and 82 $ 82 then 
81 . 82 $ 81 . 82' 
Definition 7.1.4 A pre ordered semigroup (S,·, $) is called relevant if, for all 8 E 5, s $ 
s . s. For the sake of conciseness we shall use relevant semigroup instead of relevant pre ordered 
semigroup throughout this section. 
Definition 7.1.5 Let W = (W," 1, j) be a relevant monoid and V = (V", j) be a relevant 
subsemigroup of W. An extended Kripke frame is a triple (W, V, <1) where <1 ~ V X W is a 
binary relation such that 
1. for all v E V and W,W',W" E W, if v <1 wand w j w'· w" then there exist v',v" E V 
such that v' <1 w', v" <1 w", and v j v' . v"; 
2. for all v, v', v" E V and wE W, if v <1W and v j v' . v" then there exist w', w" E W such 
that v' <l w', v" <l w", and w j w' . wI!; 
3. for all v' E V and w, w', wI! E W, ifv' <1 w' and w :::5 w' . w" then, for all v E V, if v <l w 
then v :::5 v' . w". 
Definition 7.1.6 An extended Kripke model (w, V, <1, II-) is an extended Kripke frame (W, V, <1) 
endowed with a forcing relation II- ~ W x r. Given a downward closed subset "I; of W for each 
propositional atom p, the forcing relation is defined as follows: 
1. w II- TJp iff w E T'J;; 
2. w II- eiffw j 1; 
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3. w II- 1]0 iff for all v E V such that v <l W, v II- 1]; 
4. w II- 1]2//1]1 iff for all w' E W such that w'll- 1]1, W • w'll- 1]2; 
5. w II- 1] v ~ iff for all w' E W such that w'll- 1], w . w' II- ~; 
6. W 11-/1 0/2 iff there exist WI, W2 E W such that w j WI . W2, wI II- /1, and W2 II- /2. 
Remark 7.1.7 It is worth mentioning the main differences between basic and extended Kripke 
models. First, the set V contains only the possible worlds that force an assertive formula T7 
where all radicals are in Q and therefore there might be some w rt V that forces an assertive 
formula 1]. Note however that this is the case only if rad(71) ~ Q. Second, conditions (1) and 
(2) of definition 7.1.5 make sure that, for all possible worlds w E l-V, w forces the normative 
formula 1]1 01]2 if and only if w forces the normative formula (1]1 0 1]2t, thus guaranteeing that 
the (-t operator preserves relevant conjunctions in a strong sense. Condition (3) of definition 
7.1.5 remains unchanged with respect to condition (3) of definition 4.1.3. 
7.2 Towards a semantics of proofs 
We briefly sketch how the the semantics of proofs provided in chapter 6 can be adapted to deal 
with the extended causal-deontic system. The key observation is that we need to provide a refined 
version of causal-deontic frame, all other definitions requiring only minor adjustments. 
Remark 7.2.1 Since in the new version of the ( - t rule we have the syntactic restriction that 
fj f to, we need to take care of this aspect also in the categorical semantics. The solution we pro-
pose is based on the concept of semi-monoidal or unit-free monoidal category (see for instance 
[ID-IS05]): roughly speaking, it is the categorical counterpart of the concept of semigroup. A 
unit-free monoidal category is just an ordinary monoidal category where the unit object I and 
the canonical isomorphisms A and p are missing. Since we have the structural rule of exchange 
we shall assume without further mention that unit-free monoidal categories are symmetric. Sim-
ilarly, a unit-free relevant category is just a relevant category where I, A, and p are missing. 
Unit-free relevant functors are defined as the obvious structure preserving functors. 
Definition 7.2.2 A refined causal-deonticframe (A, C, D, A *, D*, .rae, .red, 0) consists of three 
relevant categories 
A = (A, ®, I, n, A, p, T, 6) C = (C, ®, I, n, A, p, T, 6) ][J) = (D, ®, I, n, A, p, T, 8) 
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and two unit-free relevant categories 
A* = (A·,®,a,T,c5) ][Jl. = (][Jl·,®,a,T,c5) 
together with two relevant functors 
and a unit-free relevant functor 
0= (O,fh,Oo):A· --+][Jl. 
such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
1. A· r;fu.ll A and Jl}. r;fu.ll ][Jl; 1 
2 . .Jae, .Jed, and 0 are strict functors; 
3. C is closed with respect to its subcategory .JaeA; 
4. ][Jl* is closed with respect to the category .Jed(JacA). 
Remark 7.2.3 One may think of A" and][Jl" as the unit-free subcategories of A and ][Jl that have 
among their objects the interpretations of the formulae obtained by the grammars 1}' := 1}p 11}' orl' 
and ",0 := "'~ 11}° II '" 1 ",0 0 ",0 where p ranges over the set Q. 
Remark 7.2.4 To complete the definition of the categorical model for the extended causal-
deontic system we only need to specify how the definition of causal-deontic transformation has 
to be modified. It suffices to change the definition of restriction functor in such a way that it 
works with the unit-free relevant category A· instead of the relevant category A, i.e. to consider 
a functor nf: cop --+ SCat whose image semi-category has objects JacA ofC where A is an 
object of A· instead of objects JacA of C where A is an object of A. The intuition behind this 
choice is that the relevant functor 0 modelling the (_)0 operator can only be applied to objects 
and morphisms of the unit-free relevant subcategory A * of A. We omit further details and simply 
point out that the definition of the causal-deontic transformation -a: n~· --+ &~ 'and thus the 
definition of causal-deontic category can then be adapted in a straightforward way. 
I That is, A· is a full subcategory of A and ll). is a full subcategory ofll). 
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7.3 Discussion and final remarks 
In this rather short chapter he have shown how to modify certain definitions in such a way that the 
results of the previous four chapters should carry over to the extended causal-deontic fragment 
of the pragmatic language in a straightforward way. Instead of going into the details we have 
chosen to focus on the Kripke semantics and the semantics of proofs. The upshot is that, with 
only a few minor modifications, the basic causal-deontic system can be extended in such a way 
to support a notion of hypothetical norm or conditional obligation. It is worth mentioning that 
the concept of conditional obligation considered here is a rather non-standard one, in the sense 
that conditional obligation is usually considered as a dyadic operator (see for instance [Che80, 
section 10.2]). However, in the light of remarks 3.1.4 and 7.1.2, we can reduce each conditional 
obligation to one of the form ('T]~l 0 ••• 0 'T]~n) II (1]p~ 0 ••• 0 1]p'm) and thus avoid iterations of II. 
We have not investigated whether it is possible to provide a pragmatic interpretation of standard 
conditional obligation in our framework and leave this issue for future research. 
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Chapter 8 
Full intuitionistic system 
We consider the full intuitionistic fragment .c~ of the pragmatic language provided in definition 
2.3.1. We shall briefly discuss its main properties and then focus on the relationship between the 
system considered in this thesis and the system ILP considered in [BD02]. 
8.1 On the pragmatic connectives 
The sequent calculus presentation of the full intuitionistic system is obtained by adding the rules 
of figure 8.1 to the sequent calculus presentation of the basic causal-deontic system. Except for 
the (dip) rule, the pragmatic rules are exactly the standard rules of propositional intuitionistic 
logic. As for the causal-deontic system, we have that the causal-deontic fragment of the calculus 
is included in the pragmatic fragment: this is a consequence of the (dip) rule. 
Theorem 8.1.1 (cut elimination) If a sequent ~ =?x 0 is derivable according to the rules of 
figures 3.1 and 8.1 then it has a cut-free derivation. 
Proof One can extend the proof of theorem 3.1.8 in a straightforward way. o 
Remark 8.1.2 It is folklore that bicartesian closed categories are categorical models of propo-
sitional intuitionistic logic (see for instance [LS86]). Hence, we only have to introduce some 
categorical structure that allows us to model the (dip) rule. Similarly to what we have already 
seen in previous chapters, we simply need to add a bicartesian closed category IP to the definition 
of causal-deontic frame and impose that there is a relevant functor Jdp = (Jdp. t2, to): \Dl --+ 
r =?d "I 
r A (dip) ,~=?p 'Y 
8', 8', ~ =?p 8 
-----con 
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----Vax 
V, ~ =?p 8 
~ =?p 8' 8', ~ =?p 8 
----..:------=-- cut 
~ =?p 8 
81 , ~ =?p 8 82, ~ =?p 8 --.......:....-----.:..-.c U 
81 U 82, Do =?p 8 
Figure 8.1: (dip) and pragmatic rules 
lP. Note that we do not require that .:fdp is either strict or strong, the main reason being that 
"11 n "12 =?p "11 0 "12 is derivable in sequent calculus whereas "11 0 'Y2 =?p 'Yl n 'Y2 is not. To make 
things more formal let us spell out these ideas in the following definition. 
Definition 8.1.3 A pragmatic category (A, te, 10, lP, .:fae, .:fed, .:fdp, 0, '19) consists of a causal-
deontic category (A, te, 10, .:fae, .:fed, 0, '19) endowed with a bicartesian closed category lP and a 
relevant functor .:fdp = (.:fdp, £2, £0): 10 --+ lP. 
Remark 8.1.4 Unfortunately, there are some problems with the Kripke semantics. One might 
be tempted to think that there is already enough structure, i.e. the preorder :;, in the definition 
of basic Kripke frame that enables us to provide a definition of Kripke model for the full intu-
itionistic system by adding the usual clauses for propositional intuitionistic logic to the definition 
of forcing. As it is often the case, the problem arises with the units: since each w E W forces 
] we would need to have that each w E W also forces €, thus giving rise to the structural rule 
of weakening in the sequent calculus for the basic causal-deontic system. A quick fix to this 
problem could be the introduction of a new pre ordered set of possible worlds for the pragmatic 
connectives and a suitable map from the basic Kripke frame to it. However, one would loose the 
elegance and conciseness of the original Kripke semantics. 
----ax 
'TJp; - =} 'TJp 
r,'Y;A =} 8 
---- perm (A ~ A') 
r;'Y, A' =} 8 
A =} D' 
---~-RU (i = 1,2) 
A=} 81 U 82 
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----Vax 
r;V,A=}8 
_;A =} 8' r;8',A =} 8 
--------- cutp 
riA =} 8 
r;8' ,8', A=}8 
con r· 8' A=}8 p , , 
r; A =} 81 r; A =} 82 
-------Rn 
r; A =} D1 n D2 
61, A=}6 62, A=}6 
-------.cU 
81 U82,A=}8 
r;A,81 =} 82 
-----R':) 
r; A =} 81 ':) 82 
Figure 8.2: The original rules ofILP 
8.2 Relation to the original system 
We show that the sequent calculus system given in figures 3.1 and 8.1 is a conservative extension 
of the system ILP originally presented in [BD02]. The rules ofILP are provided in figure 8.2. 
Theorem 8.2.1 (equivalence of systems) If r; A=}8 is derivable in ILP then r, A =}p 8 is 
derivable according to the rules of figures 3.1 and 8.1. Conversely, if r =}d 'Y or A =}p 8 is 
derivable in the (0, f, .]')-free fragment of the sequent calculus then r; _ =} 'Y or _; A=}8 is 
derivable in ILP, respectively. 
Remark 8.2.2 The difficult part is to show that every ILP derivation can be transfonned into a 
derivation in the (0, f, J)-free fragment of the sequent calculus presented in this work. We pro-
---ax 
"lp ::}d "lp 
,', ,', r ::}d , 
--------- con 
,', r::}d , 
rl::}d"lp e,r2::}d' 
--------- C£) 
"lp £) e, rI, f2 ::}d, 
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r l ::}d" ,', r2 ::}d , 
-----------------cut 
r 1,r2::}d' 
Figure 8.3: An intermediate system 
ceed essentially in two stages. First, we introduce an intermediate system consisting of the rules 
in figures 8.3 and 8.1 and show that every ILP derivation can be transformed into a derivation in 
the intermediate system. Second, we show that every derivation in the intermediate system can 
be transformed into a derivation obtained by instances of the rules in figures 3.1 and 8.1 only. 
Definition 8.2.3 In ILP, instances of ax, cutd, COIld, £)/0-, C £) and n £) are called causal-
deontic; instances of Vax, cutp , conp, C n, 'R n, [, U, 'R U, [,::) and 'R::) are called pragmatic. 
Definition 8.2.4 An ILP derivation is in split form if every branch of the prooftree can be 
divided into three segments such that, going from the root to the leaf, (l) the first segment is 
induced by instances of pragmatic rules only, (2) the second segment is induced by instances of 
the perm rule only, and (3) the third segment is induced by instances of causal-deontic rules only. 
Remark 8.2.S In order to deal with the first stage of the proof we have introduced the concept 
of split ILP derivation. Its definition generalises the concept of quasi-canonical proof given 
in [BR03]. Transforming a split ILP derivation into a derivation in the intermediate system is 
straightforward: figure 8.4 gives a schematic representation of the process. Thus, to accomplish 
the first stage of the proof it remains to show that every ILP derivation can be transformed into 
a split ILP derivation. This is a consequence of the two technical lemmas 8.2.7 and 8.2.8 below 
which depend heavily on the notion of critical sequent. 
Definition 8.2.6 In an ILP derivation, a sequent S is called quaSi-critical if one of the following 
two conditions is satisfied: 
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[pragmatic rules 1 






[pragmatic rules 1 
Figure 8.4: Translation of derivations 
[ intermediate rules 1 
r,r' ::}d I 
r r' (dip) 
, ::}p I 
[pragmatic rules 1 
1. S is the conclusion of a perm rule and there is at least one instance of a pragmatic rule 
above perm in the prooftree; 
2. S is the conclusion of a causal-deontic rule n and there is at least one instance of a prag-
matic or perm rule above n in the prooftree. 
The sequent S is called critical if S is quasi-critical and, further, the derivations of the premises 
of either perm or n are in split form. 
Lemma 8.2.7 If a critical sequent S is the conclusion of an instance of n £) or £)10- then there 
exists a split ILP derivation of it. 
Proof Due to the definition of critical sequent, the premise of such a rule can only be an 
instance of eutp which empties the pragmatic area. So, in order to get a split derivation we can 
essentially use an argument analogous to cut elimination. Before we give the details of the proof, 
let us point out the particular form of the premises of eutp in this situation: the left one is such 
that both areas of the antecedent are empty, the right one such that exactly one formula occurs in 
the pragmatic area. As a consequence we have that all cuts in the inductive step are logical, i.e. 
the cut formula is principal in both premises. Thus we have to consider only the following two 
distinct cases. 
1. If the right premise of eu tp is the conclusion of an instance of perm then 
71"2 
11"1 r, I'; - ::} I 
_ ; _ ::} I' r; I' ::} I 
perm 
--------- eutp 
r; -::} I 
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reduces to 
11"1 11"2 
-;-=> .. y' r, ... y';_=>'Y 
------------------CUtd 
r; - => 'Y 
and, hence, by applying either n S) or S) I 0-, we have a split derivation of the critical sequent 
we started with. 
2. If the left premise of cutp is the conclusion of an instance of n:J and the right premise of 
cutp is the conclusion of an instance of £..:J then 
reduces to 
11" 
_ j 81 => 82 
-----n:J 
_ ; _ => 61 :J 82 
11"1 11"2 
- ; - => 61 r; 62 => 'Y 
--------£..:J 
rj 61 :J 82 => 'Y 
--------------------------------cutp 
rj _ =>, 
-; 61 => 152 11"2 
----------------- cutp 
-; - => 82 r; 82 => 'Y 
---------------------------cutp r; - => 'Y 
where both cuts have smaller rank. Hence, by applying either n S) or S) I 0-, we have a 
split derivation of the critical sequent we started with. The cases where the left premise is 
the conclusion of an instance of n n or n u and the right premise is the conclusion of an 
instance of £.. n or n u, respectively, are similar and therefore omitted. o 
Lemma 8.2.S If a critical sequent S is not the conclusion of an instance of n S) or S) I 0- then 
there exists a split ILP derivation of it. 
Proof If the critical sequent is the conclusion of an instance of cutd or £.. S) then the proof is 
by induction on the height of the derivation of the right premise. Note that if the right premise 
of cutd is the conclusion of an instance of perm then we can apply lemma 8.2.9 below. If the 
critical sequent is the conclusion of an instance of perm or cond then the proofis by induction on 
the height of the derivation of the premise. For illustrative purposes let us consider the following 
case: if the right premise of cutd is the conclusion of an instance of £..:J then 
11"1 11"2 
11" _;A=> 151 'Y,r2;82 ,A=>8 
---------- £..:J 
r1; 151 :J 152, A=> 'Y 'Y, r2; 151 :::> 152 , A=> 15 
-------------------------------------cutd 
r b r2j81 :::> 82,A => 15 
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reduces to 
7r' , 71"2 
7ri I\j 02,01::> 02'~ => '"'/ ,",/,r2j 02, 81 ::> 02'~ => 8 
- i 61 ::> 62, ~ => 61 r 1, r2i 62, 81 ::> 62, ~ => 6 
---------------------------------------C::> 
r1,r2i(Sr:J 02,01:J 02,A => 0 
conp 
cutd 
where 7r', 7r~, and 7r~ are obtained from 7r, 71"1, and 71"2 by weakening. Since depth-preserving 
weakening is admissible in ILP we can apply the induction hypothesis.! o 
Lemma 8.2.9 If a critical sequent r 1, r2i r, A=>'"'/ is the conclusion of an instance of cutd 
and the right premise of cutd is the conclusion of an instance of perm 
71"2 
11"1 ,',r2,ri-=> '"'/ 
" perm 
rlir,A => '"'/ "r2ir,i.\ => 'Y 
--------------------------cutd 
rl, r 2; r, i.\ => '"'/ 
then there exists a split ILP derivation of it. 
Proof By induction on the height of the derivation of the left premise. For illustrative purposes 




, , C:J 




r . r 1: 1\ , , , r . r 1: 1\ , perm 11"11 1, , u2, U => 'i' 'i', 2, , u2, u => 'i' 
, cutd 
_; r, A => 61 rl, r2; r, 62, ~' => '"'/ 
, C::> 
rl, r 2i r, 01 :J 62, A=>'"'/ 
and the induction hypothesis applies. o 
1 Depth-preserving weakening is a consequence of the way we have defined the perm rule: we refer to 
[TSOO] for a formal argument. Its intuitive meaning is that we can apply weakening without changing the 
depth of the prooftree. 
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Remark 8.2.10 We can now turn to the second stage of the proof of theorem 8.2.1. This is 
basically accomplished by the following lemma. 
Lemma 8.2.11 If ~ =?x 8 is derivable in the intermediate system then it is derivable according 
to the rules of figures 3.1 and 8.1. 
Proof We consider instances of intermediate rules n that satisfy the following two conditions: 
1. the principal formula ofn does not contain subformulae of the form T]~; 
2. the formula in the succedent of the conclusion ofn is of the form T]~. 
If we take the topmost of these instances and push it upwards in the proofiree then, by iterated 
application of this process, we can bring all instances of purely causal rules such as CD above 
the instances of (-t in the prooftree. For illustrative purposes let us consider the following 
two cases involving an instance of CD satisfying the above conditions. Since the formula in 
the succedent of the left premise of CD is not of the form T];, we can assume without loss of 
generality that all formulae in the antecedent are purely causal. 
permutes to 
rr' 
2. cut vs. CD 
permutes to 
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It is then easy to see that we can obtain the desired derivation of the sequent we started with by 
inserting instances of (aj c) and (c j d) in the appropriate places. 0 
8.3 Discussion and final remarks 
We have considered the full intuitionistic fragment of the logic for pragmatics and shown how the 
system presented in this thesis relates to the system originally proposed by Bellin and Dalla Pozza 
in [BD02]. Note that there are two issues that seem worth to be investigated. First, although it 
is fairly easy to provide a categorical semantics for the full intuitionistic fragment, we have dis-
covered that, rather surprisingly, there are problems with the definition of the Kripke semantics. 
We have outlined a possible solution to the problem at the end of remark 8.1.4 but it seems that 
one should look for something better. Second, it would be interesting to see what categorical 
structures are needed to interpret the original system of Bellin and Dalla Pozza and to compare 




In this thesis we have developed a sound and complete categorical semantics for the full intu-
itionistic fragment of the logic for pragmatics with assertions, obligations, and causal implication 
originally proposed by Bellin and Dalla Pozza in [BD02] and an extension thereof with condi-
tional obligations or hypothetical norms. Along the way we have also investigated its proof and 
type theory, provided a class of sound and complete Kripke models, and shown that the Kripke 
models can be regarded as a degenerate instance of the categorical semantics by relating them 
to a class of sound and complete algebraic models. Since we have already hinted at omissions 
and unresolved issues in the final section of almost each chapter let us conclude the thesis with a 
short list of possible directions for future research. 
Deontic logic and paradoxes Although we made an effort to make the philosophical assump-
tions underlying this body of work as accessible as possible we have not treated the philosophical 
consequences inherent to it in great detail. In particular, the extension of the framework with the 
concept of conditional obligation seems to make it possible to tackle certain puzzles (see for 
instance [McN06, section 4.5]) in deontic logic. 
Dealing with the full system Note that, at the end of chapter 2, we have made the simplifying 
assumption that the radical part a of an elementary formula consists only of atomic propositions 
p. Giving up that assumption means that one has to take into consideration the full system. One 
of the key features of the full logic for pragmatics is that the interaction between sentential for-
mulae and propositions is expressed via modal translations from intuitionistic to classical modal 
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logic (see the translation schemes provided in chapter 2). The challenge is thus to investigate a 
categorical semantics for classical modal logic and for the G6del-McKinsey-Tarski interpretation 
of intuitionistic logic in the classical modal logic S4. 
Towards a theory of actions It would be interesting to investigate the possibility of developing a 
theory of actions. White's recent work [Whi08] on a categorical formulation of Reiter's solution 
to the frame problem is a promising step towards that direction. Technically speaking, it is based 
on fibrations over labelled transition systems and would allow for a more dynamic approach to 
the logic for pragmatics. Further, White's framework allows one to deal with a wide range of 
modal operators and thus it seems also to be a good candidate for studying the full logic for 
pragmatics with the aforementioned reflection principle. 
Decidabi/ity and complexity issues We have only mentioned in passing the close connection 
between causal implications or conditional obligations and the Horn fragment of multiplicative 
linear logic extended with the structural rule of contraction. It is well known that relevant logics 
behave rather badly with respect to decidability and complexity (see for instance [ResO~]), but 
one might hope that the restrictions imposed by our framework have some positive impact. The 
most promising line of attack would be to follow [Kan95] and to investigate whether Horn linear 
logic with contraction can be related to a suitable class of Petri nets, thus providing means to take 
advantage of the many results available in that field. 
IIlocutionary logic and perlocutions In [SV85] one can find a whole body of work on illocu-
tionary logic. It should be very useful to compare the set-theoretic approach taken there with 
the semantic approach taken in this thesis. Furthermore, in the literature on speech act theory 
(see for instance [Lev83]) there is also the concept of perlocutionary act which denotes the act 
of producing a certain effect in the hearer by uttering a sentence. Since in the full system it is 
possible to make a distinction between descriptive and expressive use of pragmatic operators we 
think that the logic for pragmatics forms a good starting point for investigating this concept, thus 
providing a framework for the study of intended meaning. 
Software agent communication New paradigms in software engineering such as software agents 
make heavy use of speech act theory in order to investigate possible frameworks for communi-
cation between autonomous software agents (see for instance [LabOI] and [MP03]). We think 
that the logic for pragmatics studied in this thesis could be very useful to provide specification 
languages for dialogue protocols. One of the limitations of the logic is that it does not deal 
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with many types of pragmatic forces. Thus it would be important to find meaningful patterns of 
common-sense reasoning and to extend the rudimentary language with new pragmatic operators 
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